


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TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM
ORO-T-44(FEC)



ORO

OPERATIONS RESEARCH
OFFICE

Johns Hopkins
University

Chinese Communist and North Korean Methods of Motivating Riflemen for Combat

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By authority of C.R.T.D. D/A
28 Nov 58 Memo 58-161
By E.V. White, OAO, DCG
Date 6 Jan 1959

by

Frank J. Harris

Received: 30 July 1953

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
APO 343

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AG 350.06 GC-D

1 April 1954

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Tech Memo ORO-T-43 (FEC)

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TO: The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Assistant Chief of Staff, G3

By authority of CR-D 8 Sept 59
Re memo 59-39
By CA Bunnell
Date 21 Oct 59

1. Reference is made to letter, Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East dated 17 September 1953, subject: Technical Memorandum ORO-T-43 (FEC), file AG 350.06 GC-PO

2. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-43 (FEC), "A Study of Combat Communications in Korea", represents an effort to analyze comprehensively the structure of the communications system within the combat division and to recommend improvements in equipment and techniques.

3. In general, the factual data are an accurate reflection of tactical communications in an extended, static situation. Since the study covers a relatively short period, many of the conditions found by the committee were peculiar to that period and are no longer important. The well-known limitations of old equipment in Korean use should be corrected to some degree, by newly developed equipment now being distributed. The problems attributed to untrained personnel are representative of conditions which will be encountered as a result of rapid, continuous personnel rotation. It appears that recommendations were made largely in consideration of technical aspects only; consequently, while many are worthy of serious study, others lose their weight in the light of military problems to which they are necessarily subordinate.

4. A recurring theme in the discussion of problems of competent personnel, equipment maintenance, and technical supervision, is the desirability of establishment of a separate technical echelon to control communications. It is felt the basic structure of existing supervisory echelons is adequate to correlate requirements and capabilities within the command. Further, since communications represent a tactical tool which assists the commander in maintaining control, it is considered that the establishment of additional technical echelons with power to interfere in that control is unwise, and that communications should continue to remain in tactical channels.

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AG 350.06 GC-0

1 April 1954

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Tech Memo ORO-T-43 (FEC)

5. Experience in the Far East has shown a need for telephone communications service greater than that possible to provide with presently-authorized T/O&E equipment. The heavy demand for telephone service in Korea does not appear to have been caused entirely by abnormal conditions; a need has been demonstrated for more suitable equipment of adequate capacity to meet the operational requirements at each level of command.

6. Further study should be given the problems of security procedures and the preparation and handling of written messages. Revision of accepted procedures appears to be necessary to provide proper acceleration of traffic affected by these problems.

7. Two hundred fifty (250) copies of this letter are forwarded for attachment to subject technical memorandum in compliance with letter, G3 ORO (6 February 1952) Department of the Army, 7 February 1952, subject: Distribution of Publications of the Department of the Army Operations Research Office. In addition, copies of this letter and the comments of subordinate commands and staff sections of Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East have been forwarded to the Director of Operations Research Office, Far East Command, for his information.

8. Specific comments on this technical memorandum are presented in Inclosure 1.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:



1 Incl
Specific Comments on
ORO-T-43 (FEC)

F. M. COWMAN
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM ORO-T-43 (FEC)
A Study of Combat Communications Korea
January - July 1952

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Comments are made on all recommendations (pages 29-35) considered appropriate for AFPE comment. These items not specifically noted are either covered by other remarks or, by their nature, not suitable for authoritative evaluation by this headquarters.

1. Page 29 (General): This paragraph infers that there is no one person with overall responsibility for communications in the Army area. The Army commander, through his Signal Officer, is responsible for the planning and technical operation of Army communications to provide maximum integration and efficiency for the command. Considered purely from the standpoint of maximum communications efficiency, an overall engineering and control organization might be desirable; the static Korean situation would facilitate such centralization of control.

2. Pages 29-30 (Telephone Traffic): a. Item 1. Army telephone operating procedures are in line with commercial practices and are considered to be sound. Basically, the difficulties appear to be caused by excessive load on the system, and aggravated by the constant replacement of qualified supervisors and operators by inexperienced and poorly trained personnel, plus the absence of adequate supervisory equipment on the switchboards.

b. Item 2. Party-line operation appears to be developed about as deeply as is feasible for general use. It is believed that the results of excessive use of party-lining would include:

(1) Bottlenecking facilities and destroying their responsiveness to critical situations.

(2) Increasing the load on available facilities.

(3) Introducing switchboard problems in establishment of priorities for party-line use by subscribers. Improved training and discipline for subscribers and switchboard operators would improve operational conditions.

c. Item 3. Concur.

3. Pages 30-31 (Wire Construction): a. Item 1. Concur.

b. Item 2. To save dispensers, a method has been devised and is in use whereby one (1) dispenser and four (4) reels of field wire are paid out.

c. Item 3. Concur.

Inclosure 1

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SPECIFIC COMMENTS(Cont'd)

d. Item 4. Concur. While combat experience has proven properly-buried wire to be least vulnerable to artillery fire, the amount of wire to be buried, interferences other than shell fire and the inconvenience of relocating it for servicing make doubtful a conclusion that buried wire is the best all-around answer. Therefore, optimum height and cabling construction procedures should be investigated; for application in those areas not immediately within critical shell-fire zones.

e. Item 5. The value of a time and motion study of field wire maintenance is questionable. Considering length of circuits and type of terrain involved in Korea, an average time of two hours to locate and repair a fault is not considered excessive.

f. Item 8. Various types of telephone repeaters have been developed and are items of Signal Corps issue.

g. Item 9. There is still a need for an amplifying telephone to be employed on long local circuits where attenuation is excessive.

h. Item 11. Concur.

4. Page 31 (Carrier Circuits): Item 1. Recommend continuation of the present method of providing low net loss circuits by the Signal unit or communication section which is responsible for providing the circuit. It is not considered advisable for units rearward of the Division to be responsible for carrier circuits within the Division Communications Net.

5. Pages 31-32 (Teletype): a. Item 1. Provision of more rapid cryptographic equipment will improve the usefulness of teletype facilities between Division and Regiment. Under normal combat conditions with an adequate number of trained personnel to operate terminal equipment, considerable traffic would probably be passed over teletype circuits forward of division. The expansion of telephone service in Korea has minimized the importance of teletype.

b. Item 2. At the time of the study, an abnormal communications condition was presented by excessive distances between Division and Division Rear. When such a condition is permitted, Army should furnish the additional facilities required. In a more mobile situation, it is considered that presently-authorized equipment will meet requirements.

c. Item 3. Relay services at Corps appear adequate to provide expeditious movement of traffic between Army and Division Main. It is not considered feasible to provide direct teletype circuits between Army and Division because of the amount of additional equipment and personnel required.

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SPECIFIC COMMENTS (Cont'd)

d. Item 4. Concur in the need for fast, simple cipher equipment, possibly with characteristics as described for the AFSAM-7 Crypto system.

6. Page 32 (Message Center): Concur in the need for simplifying message preparation and handling procedures. The expansion of message center duties to include distribution of quantities of paper other than messages has encouraged delays in message processing until the onset of low-traffic periods.

7. Pages 32-33 (Radio): a. Item 1. Radio design provides for point to point or conference operation as required.

b. Item 2. Frequencies are allocated in Korea on an area basis, but the control of assignments is on a unit basis. Where two units operate in the same area, it is the responsibility of the next higher headquarters to resolve the frequency problem.

c. Item 3. The presently-used monthly cycle of change in radio frequencies is accepted as the best compromise between possible security weaknesses and administrative difficulties involved. To confuse enemy detection units, daily changes would be required; combat patrol frequencies are changed on this basis. General changes in the complex system of radio frequency control would have the following effects:

(1) introduce an extraordinary burden upon frequency-planning groups;

(2) require special facilities to disseminate SOI changes down to working level without delay;

(3) require augmentation of unit personnel and additional equipment to realign and check nets;

(4) ultimately confuse friendly radio personnel as much as enemy intercept groups.

d. Item 5. Do not concur. A fixed-channel net can be easily located and jammed by enemy intelligence; its dependability is reduced accordingly. The use of music as an attraction would further identify the net and facilitate enemy interference.

e. Item 6. Concur.

f. Item 12. Not considered sound. If sets were designed for automatic operation, the higher-powered receiver would be constantly turned on or off by any noise or static of the frequency monitored. If

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SPECIFIC COMMENTS (Cont'd)

not automatic, the set would have to provide normal amplification to attract the operator's attention. The additional equipment is not justified.

g. Item 13. Consideration of the issue of individual radio sets at squad level must recognize:

- (1) the added burden of supply and maintenance at this level.
- (2) the added weight to be carried by the combat soldier.
- (3) the probability that the majority of such sets would be discarded on the battlefield under stress of combat or as soon as batteries are dead.

h. Item 15. Concur. Improved power sources are desirable.

8. Page 34 (Cipher and Security): a. Items 2 and 3. AFSAL codes in nine languages have been produced and distributed to units in Korea by ASAPAC. The selection of words and phrases used in these codes has proven satisfactory.

b. Item 5. Speedier cipher techniques for field use are needed. The AFSAM-7 should provide a marked improvement over the M-209.

9. Page 34 (Naval Gunfire Support): a. Items 1 and 2. Do not concur. Radio equipment presently assigned to Naval Gunfire Control personnel is generally adequate. In specific instances field expedients or special equipment may be required to overcome conditions encountered.

b. Item 3. Shackle codes are used by Naval Gunfire spotting teams, and are normally changed daily.

10. Page 35 (Personnel): Do not concur in the recommendation that communications positions in combat units at battalion and regimental levels should be filled by Signal Corps personnel. Communications is the link that integrates the various tactical elements into an effective unit. Because of the primary tactical importance of this function, communications personnel should remain assigned to the branch to which their activities contribute, not that to which their equipment belongs. Knowledge of equipment characteristics is less important than intimate familiarity with objectives of the unit and the effective contribution of communications elements to its mission. Increasing complexity of field communications equipment should not be accepted as justification for a requirement for specialists to handle it. Combat equipment which cannot be used by the average soldier after reasonable application is of limited usefulness in the field. Continued effort should be made to develop simpler equipment which can be used by combat unit personnel and yet satisfy requirements for communication.


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the contents are invited. Remarks should
be addressed to:


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

abstract taken by *Sari Saengerberg*

date

2 Oct. 57



**PLEDGE
SYSTEM**



**POST-COMBAT
CRITIQUES**

**CCF TECHNIQUES
TO PROMOTE THE ...**


WILL-TO-FIGHT



**SPEAK-BITTERNESS
SESSIONS**



**CRITICISM
MEETINGS**



**CHALLENGE
SYSTEM**



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his appreciation to the following individuals and organizations:

Dr. Frederic R. Wickert, an ORO consultant, worked with the author in the planning and organization of the study in the ZI, in developing questionnaires and training interrogators in Japan and Korea, in locating documentary material, and in interviewing various non-prisoner personnel. All data in Chapter VII on the ROKA were obtained by Dr. Wickert.

A particular debt of gratitude is due the Commanding Officers and staff of the 302d Military Intelligence Service Company and the 511th Military Intelligence Service Company. These organizations generously provided material assistance in the form of skilled interrogators and interpreters.

The 500th Military Intelligence Service Group, G-2, FEC, facilitated the study both in making arrangements for POW interrogations and in assisting with the document search.

The following organizations were helpful in discussing the study or in making records available: G-2, FEC; G-2, EUSAK; Hq KMAG; Psywar, FEC; POW Command; Hq FEAF; RTC #1, ROKA; Division of Intelligence for Far East Research, US Dept of State.

Mr. Paul B. Denlinger was responsible for the interrogation of several of the POWs used in the study. A number of ORO colleagues provided advice and counsel during the study and generously reviewed the manuscript. Dr. Paul B. Foreman, Mr. A. H. Hausrath, and Dr. Lincoln F. Hanson, in particular, were associated with the study during the planning phase.

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

To study and describe the methods used by the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Army in motivating riflemen for combat; to evaluate the effectiveness of these methods and to compare them with those of the Republic of Korea Army; to formulate principles and procedures to counteract enemy motivation; and to suggest means of improving methods of motivating US troops.

FACTS

The will-to-fight of the Chinese Communist and North Korean soldier has been widely acclaimed. Headquarters, Far East Command, initiated a request for the Operations Research Office to study the methods used by this enemy and realistically to appraise the strengths and weakness of these methods. Insight into why these soldiers fight as they do will provide a basis for present understanding and future planning, will lead to measures for counteracting the will-to-fight, will provide information useful in directing and controlling enemy prisoners of war, will assist US Army military advisory groups in more effectively carrying out their responsibilities with Oriental allies, will provide some basis for better understanding and treating US prisoners of war, and may be expected to yield suggestions for improving the will-to-fight of the US combat rifleman.

This study approaches the problem from a broad base. Published reports were reviewed and a questionnaire drawn up which was administered to 63 CCF and NKA riflemen POWs. In addition, 4 CCF political and cultural officers and 21 KMAG and ROKA personnel were interviewed in Korea from October to December 1952. Army intelligence and other documents were thoroughly reviewed. Various UN personnel were interviewed in FEC, EUSAK, and the ZI.

DISCUSSION

The role of the political organization in the CCF and NKA is unique and complex and must be understood in order to appreciate the operation of motivational techniques. In the armies concerned, there are two chains of command—the military and the political. For all practical purposes, the political organization controls the military and carries out its own functions through enlisted and commissioned Communist Party members. Political control extends through sub-squad or cell level. Combat performance itself is viewed in terms of political beliefs.

The political training or indoctrination to which the rifleman is subjected is thorough and continuous, occupying roughly 50 percent of his time in the Army. The main themes are: the reasons for fighting—to save China (Korea) from the American imperialists; and the nature of the enemy—the US enemy is said to be weakest in its personnel and strongest in its resources and materiel support. (In contrast, the ROKA is said to have a source of strength in its soldiers.) The great majority of POWs in this study had not received indoctrination prior to their military service. This is not likely to be true of future servicemen in these armies.

These armies are making vigorous efforts to promote high morale, in general, through raising the social prestige of the soldier by educating him and controlling his relationships with civilians, through enlisting the support of the soldier in decision-making and other practices designed to create the semblance of a truly democratic army, through eliminating the sadistic and arbitrary practices of previous military regimes, and through improving his physical welfare.

The specific techniques utilized to promote the will-to-fight which were studied are the following.

"Speak-Bitterness"

This is a session held several times in a soldier's career at which all participate in relating past sufferings at the hands of the previous regime. It is accompanied by a good deal of emotionality and incites the soldier to avenge past wrongs.

Challenge or Competition System

This is a technique used throughout the armies to ensure the successful completion of a task or mission. Individuals or groups challenge one another, thus bringing about the accomplishment of

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goals through seemingly voluntary participation rather than through rigid orders from above.

Pledge-Signing

Whenever a major mission is to be performed, the political officer encourages the men to commit themselves to a specific form of behavior, such as not surrendering or not retreating, through signing a pledge, sometimes in blood. Pledge-signing is not compulsory and is, in fact, much more popular with Party than with non-Party members.

Criticism Meeting

This, the most universally employed of the techniques studied, is a meeting held each night in which the individual confesses his "sins" of the day, criticizes himself, and participates in criticizing others. The nature of the sins and the flavor of the meeting are political. Public humiliation is a very painful experience to most of these soldiers, but because of the close surveillance in these armies, it is difficult to avoid except by conformity to expected behaviors.

Post-Combat Critiques

These, too, are politically oriented and serve as a basis for criticism of ineffective performance and reward for effective performance. The reward system is elaborate and effective. Rewards include small material benefits, but the emphasis is on psycho-social rewards of increased public recognition and honor.

Almost half of the POWs sampled indicated that the indoctrination program was at least fairly effective in making them want to fight. This response was not significantly different between CCF and NKA, between those captured and those who surrendered, between those who had served formerly in the CNA and those who had not, or between the newer and older prisoners.

Strengths of the motivational program most frequently mentioned by the CCF POWs were the indoctrination itself and the system of control, in that order.

A survey was made of ROKA methods of indoctrination as implemented through US Army Korean Military Advisory Group personnel. Although limited in scope, the survey reveals that the ROKA program is essentially the same as the US Troop Information and Education Program. Very little time is spent on in-

[REDACTED]

doctrination as such. There seems to be little appreciation of the need to relate the indoctrination message and method meaningfully to the particular cultural group. This suggests that the South Koreans could probably do a better job themselves if given less "advice" in this sphere and more autonomy.

In summary then, what happens to the typical non-Party soldier in the Army to account for his will-to-fight? Many factors enter the picture. The recruit is treated well and made to feel important at the outset. He is immediately bombarded with indoctrination to free him of former political ties and values and to develop a feeling of hatred for an enemy who is depicted as an inhuman monster and a threat to his family and country. He is relatively well clothed and fed and learns to look to the political officer as the person most interested in his welfare. He feels that he has a voice in company decisions and finds himself getting involved to the point where he is publicly committing himself to fighting determinedly. Through public criticism and self-criticism he is made to suffer for incorrect thoughts or acts; constant surveillance ensures that his every word and deed is recorded and reported.

At the time of battle he is stimulated to a frenzy by the political and cultural officer and goes into combat with emotionally charged feelings about the morality of his cause, hatred of a vicious enemy, betterment of his loved ones, self-committed pledges and accepted challenges, promise of rewards, fear of punishment, and pride in unit. He is led by a "model" soldier and Party member.

The mass attack cannot be viewed simply as a matter of control and coercion, nor as an expression of some mysterious force which makes for fanaticism. It is the culmination of a number of forces cleverly and relentlessly brought to bear on the soldier as an individual and as a member of a group. Control is playing a large role, as is leadership. But between these extremely simple explanations lies the ceaseless indoctrination, the exhortations, the channeling of thoughts, actions, and energies toward bravery in combat.

CONCLUSIONS

Description of Methods

1. CCF and NKA methods of motivating riflemen for combat are oriented toward securing the individual's acceptance of the political goals of the Communist Party.

[REDACTED]

2. The methods include a combination of generally improving the physical, social, and psychological well-being of the soldier; providing him, through indoctrination, with a reason for fighting; and utilizing specific techniques such as criticism meetings and pledge-signing to promote more effective combat performance.

3. The methods exploit social and psychological, rather than physical, rewards and punishments.

4. The North Koreans are exposed less frequently to these specific techniques.

5. Fifty percent or more of the riflemen's time while in service is devoted to political training.

6. Indoctrination depicts the US infantryman as the weakest factor in the US Army.

Effectiveness of Methods

1. The methods appear to be quite effective in maintaining control, but are only moderately successful in modifying basic attitudes.

2. Strengths: (a) capitalize on and exploit Oriental values and traditions; (b) the welfare of the common soldier has been improved; (c) positive rewards for effective performance are emphasized.

3. Weaknesses: (a) dependence on the hard core within the Army; (b) vulnerability in being unable to keep promises and achieve goals; (c) awareness of and resentment of fundamentally coercive aspects of the methods; (d) lack of opportunity for individual expression; (e) humiliation from public criticism may lead to a strong undercurrent of hostility toward the regime; (f) responsibility for maintaining the identification of morality with the Party mission is difficult.

Comparison with ROKA Methods

1. ROKA methods of motivating combat riflemen are essentially US methods with little apparent attempt to capitalize on Korean values, culture, or tradition.

2. ROKA methods are less purposive, less time-consuming, and less pervasive than CCF-NKA methods.

Implications for the US Army

1. A knowledge of Communist methods will be helpful in understanding treatment of US POWs.

[REDACTED]

2. The enemy version of the weakness of the US infantryman warrants serious consideration.

3. The US Army indoctrination program is strikingly different from CCF-NKA programs in emphasis and substance. This suggests a critical review of the US program.

RECOMMENDATIONS


1. Information concerning CCF-NKA methods of promoting will-to-fight should be disseminated to: strategic planning personnel, Far East field commanders, TI&E personnel, CI&E and Prisoner of War Command personnel, and Military Advisory Groups in the Far East.

2. Counteract CCF-NKA will-to-fight through military pressure and psychological warfare pressure. Recommended psywar themes: fallibility of CCF-NKA leadership, immorality of CCF-NKA war aims, morality and humaneness of US, coercive Communist practices, unfulfilled Communist promises, cruelty of self-criticism.


3. Critically evaluate US Army indoctrination. Consider increasing time spent, capitalizing on American values and culture, exploiting social pressures and positive rewards.


4. Allow Oriental allies more autonomy in developing their indoctrination methods and themes.

5. Provide Oriental POWs with a substantive and purposive cause to counteract enemy methods.



CHINESE COMMUNIST AND NORTH KOREAN
METHODS OF MOTIVATING RIFLEMEN FOR COMBAT





CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF STUDY

Army field commanders have commented on the will-to-fight of the Chinese Communist and North Korean soldier. This study is an attempt to find out what makes for the aggressive spirit so frequently reported. Stories of mass, suicidal, human sea-wave attacks are legion. Whatever the factors,

...no one can doubt the battlefield courage and combat persistency of the Chinese.^{1*} The Red armies in Korea are effective fighting forces.... Overwhelming numbers of Communist soldiers can overrun United Nations positions, even if the price they pay in dead and wounded is excessive by any gauge. By accepting death in their foxholes and bunkers rather than retreating, they can make UN attacks costly. The fierce determination and courage of Communist soldiers cannot be challenged, and it is valuable.²

These are just two of the comments made by observers of the contemporary Korean scene. The Far East Command initiated a request that the Operations Research Office make a research effort to answer the question, "What makes the Communist soldier fight as he does?" The resultant study does not attempt to determine how well the Communist soldier fights (as compared with any other soldier) but assumes that he fight vigorously enough for the US Army to be concerned with him as an effective foe. This report does not attempt to study the total complex of factors in the soldier's motivation, i.e., family background, attitudes, interests, but only those aspects of motivation initiated by the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) and North Korean Army (NKA) themselves. Only official attitudes and actions taken by the Army, unofficial influences within the Army, and an evaluation of these factors and influences in terms of will-to-fight are described in this memorandum. It concentrates on the combat rifleman of the CCF and NKA, the common soldier rather than the officer or noncommissioned officer.

* Superior numbers refer to entries in References.

[REDACTED]

A secondary objective of the study is to compare CCF and NKA motivating methods with those of the US as they are applied to South Koreans (ROKA).

This study should be of value to the US Army by: providing intelligence about the enemy for present understanding and future planning; yielding principles and procedures for counter-acting the enemy will-to-fight; providing suggestions for improving techniques of motivating US troops; providing information useful in more effectively directing and controlling POWs; assisting US Army Military Advisory Groups in more effectively carrying out their responsibilities for indoctrinating Oriental allies; providing information useful in understanding and treating repatriated US POWs.

SOURCES OF DATA

This study is exploratory. Data have been obtained from a wide variety of sources from which a broad picture has been drawn, rather than relying exclusively upon any single source.


Interrogation of CCF and NKA Enlisted Men

The foremost source of information was the enemy combat rifleman himself. In a study of motivation, the report of the individual is primary data. Sixty-three enlisted POWs representing 26 different Army divisions were interviewed intensively in Korea from October through December 1952.* Details concerning the composition of the sample are given in Appendix B. Description of interrogation operations and discussion of representativeness of the sample are in Appendices A and C respectively. A reproduction of the Interrogation Form is presented in Appendix D.

Interrogations of CCF Officers

Two CCF political officers and two CCF cultural officers were interviewed in an attempt to round out the picture of the methods used to promote combat motivation. This Interrogation Form is reproduced in Appendix E.

*The small sample size reflects the relative quiet of the battle zone at the time of the study. These few prisoners represented virtually all available recently captured or surrendered enemy riflemen at this time.



Review of Army Intelligence Documents

Through the generous assistance and cooperation of the 500th Military Intelligence Service Group and the G-2 Library, Department of the Army, the following series of documents were reviewed in their entirety (through 1952) and all information* pertinent to the study at hand was extracted: Interrogation Reports, KG Series; Enemy Documents, Korean Operations; Enemy Documents, North Korean Forces; "Supplement," Enemy Documents, Korean Operations; "Bulletin," Enemy Documents, Korean Operations; "Research Supplement," Interrogation Reports.

Further Documentary Coverage and Interviews with UN Personnel

Interviews were conducted with and supplementary documentary coverage obtained through personnel in the following agencies: G-2, FEC; G-2, EUSAK; Hq KMAG; Psywar, FEC; Division of Intelligence for Far East Research, Department of State; Prisoner of War Command; ROKA; Hq FEAF; AUFERG; Hq KComZ.

Other Studies and Reports

This is neither the first nor only attempt to shed light on the characteristics of the Chinese and North Korean soldier. RAND has published RM-902, Political Organization and Morale in the Chinese Communist Forces,³ based on interrogations conducted with POWs from March through May 1951. The present ORO study, to a considerable extent, corroborates and supplements this RAND study. Other major sources in the bibliography include Red China's Fighting Hordes, by Lt Col Robert B. Rigg,⁴ and The Chinese Communist Army, Dept of the Army Pamphlet No. 30-51.⁵ The usual bibliographic search yielded a number of isolated references. Finally, the wisdom and experience of individuals too numerous to mention have been distilled and perhaps serve as the mortar of this report.

ORGANIZATION

Following this chapter there is a more or less detailed consideration of the relationship between political organization and motivation in the CCF. Then come two chapters on general efforts

*The types of information found included interrogations of prisoners taken earlier, captured official documents and records, captured personal notes, and US G-2 studies.

[REDACTED]

directed toward increasing combat motivation--the first focussing on political training and the second on general Army policy level efforts. Chapter V considers specific motivating techniques. Chapter VI considers the effectiveness of these various methods, while Chapter VII reviews, on a limited basis, the ROKA program for motivation.

The bulk of this report reflects the CCF because more data are presently available on this group. Strategically, as well as numerically, the CCF is a more important potential future enemy than the NKA. As far as can be determined, most of what is reported here about the CCF applies also to NKA. Where this is known not to be true, it will be so noted. Where possible, separate analyses have been made for these two armies.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE CCF AND NKA

INTRODUCTION

Any attempt to understand the will-to-fight of the Communist soldier must of necessity involve some understanding and appreciation of the role of politics in the structure and functioning of the military.

Mao Tse-tung has said that the significance of the Chinese Communist Army lies in the fact that it is the armed representative of the classes in carrying out their political responsibilities. Its work is to establish and bulwark political power. [Political personnel are expected] to stabilize and intensify the martial spirit of the armed forces, so as to on the one hand support the existing political establishment and on the other to be prepared to meet any enemy attack.²

An underlying premise in the armies under consideration is that the "military is the continuation of politics." (No. 73*)⁶ Of particular relevance to this study is the fact that the political organization is responsible for those functions in the CCF which are related to motivation and will-to-fight.

DUAL-COMMAND STRUCTURE

There exists in the CCF (and NKA) a unique[†] and complex dual chain of command, the military and the political.* There are two major structures[‡] within the political command as shown in Fig. 1.

First, there is within the formal Army establishment a Political Work Organization, controlled by and responsible to the Party, in which a political officer (or commissar) is stationed at each echelon

* Numbers in parentheses following quotations are POW numbers.

† Even the Soviet system does not extend its political organization as far down the military echelon as does the CCF.³

‡ The structure is described in detail in other documents, cf. 3;7

§ As well as several other organizational structures for ensuring political control.

down to and including company. The political officer has the same rank as the unit military commander. The political officer has his own channels of communication.




Fig. 1—Political organization in the Chinese Communist Forces.

The second major political structure is the Party Committee, established at each echelon down to sub-squad levels.* These committees are not actually an integral part of the military establishment, but serve as auxiliary bodies to the military and influence its operations and personnel. It is not uncommon for the political officer within the formal military structure to serve also as chairman or secretary of the committee attached to his unit.

FUNCTIONS

Functionally, the political organization has control over the military organization, although in many cases a commander at a given echelon wears both hats. Many of the positions of military leadership are filled by Party members; in practice, this duality of organization and command appears to function relatively smoothly. Military orders must be countersigned by the political officer; political orders, on the other hand, need not be countersigned by the military commander. The real authority in the CCF lies with the political officers.

The Party Committee has the role of reinforcing the influence of political officers upon military officers, mediating conflicts between them and serving as an additional means of control and

*Platoon and squad cells operate under the Company Party Committee.

~~SECRET~~

surveillance over all military personnel, including Party members. At the battalion level the Party Committee meets weekly to review reports submitted by cell leaders.

The Political Work Organization has the function of raising the level of political consciousness of the soldier through indoctrination and other techniques which are described in Chapter V.

The functions and scope of the political organization will be seen more clearly as its key personnel are examined.

KEY PERSONNEL

The Company Political Officer

This officer symbolizes the CCF system. He

...is responsible, directly or indirectly, for securing results in the following spheres: material welfare, medical care, assistance to soldiers' families; indoctrination and education, information and propaganda, promotion of comradeship, cohesion and positive morale; counselling on soldiers' service problems, processing of leave, furlough and marriage applications; allocation of praise and blame, rewards and punishments, surveillance of unit military leaders' behavior towards the men and their conduct of military affairs; regulation of relations between unit members and civilian populations; protection of unit from subversive influences, etc.³

The Company Cultural Instructor

The company cultural instructor works directly under the company political officer. He is required to be "normal" in his political thinking. His official functions include raising the level of knowledge of the troops; developing recreational and athletic activities for the purpose of maintaining morale; organizing and encouraging the study of political subjects; encouraging the soldiers to fight through the use of cartoons, songs, leaflets, and broadcasts; and attacking the enemy at the front through scattering leaflets, name calling, and slogan writing.

One MIS document has this to say about the role of the cultural officer in the NKA:

Not only is [the] cultural officer accountable for combat efficiency, discipline, and morale within the unit, but he is also alleged to hold joint responsibility with the company commander for purely tactical matters such as the adequacy of combat preparations, training of troops, and other matters determining the success or failure of the organization in battle. (No. 99)⁸

The role of the cultural officer is not a prestigious one if the following words of an interrogated CCF POW are to be believed.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

The cultural officer had no prestige, however. The attitude of the other officers was, "We built the empire for you to enjoy." On the entry into Korea the position of the cultural officers was further subordinated. Classes were not held regularly, and the cultural officer was generally assigned other non-combat duties. The most important cultural work in Korea was reading newspapers to the men. (No. 701846)⁹

An NKA officer described the role of the cultural officer essentially as the same. (No. 133785)⁹

The Enlisted Communist Party Member

Positions of leadership in the CCF are held by Communist Party or Youth Corps members.* These members constitute the hard core of the Army. According to statistics of the Chinese Communist Party compiled in 1950, 20 percent of the Chinese Communist Army were Party members.⁷ Other interrogations tend to corroborate this (Nos. 32,¹⁰ 73⁶). A battalion grade political officer in the CCF informed interviewers that, upon induction, all personnel are classified into one of the three following groups.[†] (a) The die-hard type: these are the hard-core Communists, estimated to constitute from 20 to 30 percent of the enlisted total. (b) The average type: these are the majority, representing about 60 percent of the Army, who have no strong political leanings one way or another. (c) The "falling behind" or "lagging behind" type: these represent about 15 percent of the Army and are further subdivided into (1) the stupid type, (2) the questioning type, (3) the "don't give-a-damn" type. Type (a) is the backbone of the Army. They influence Type (b). Together they control and suppress Type (c).

Further intelligence tells one that a combat squad in the CCF is divided into three groups, each of which is composed of three or four men. Each group has a leader who, insofar as possible, is a Party adherent. This organization, called the "3-3 tactic," is the basic organization of infantry combat tactics within the CCF. It is a shrewd means of "providing intimate leadership, guidance, and surveillance of less reliable, less experienced, and less well motivated soldiers by political activists who are also experienced military soldiers."³ These leaders serve as "models" of combat behavior and have the additional responsibility of maintaining constant surveillance over the actions and expressed thoughts of those around them.

*Soldiers between 18 and 25 who are qualified to be candidates for Party membership.

[†]The terms used represent the interrogator's best effort at translating concepts from Chinese into English.

[REDACTED]

Requirements for CP membership are strict and the goal of membership is not easily attained.

Requirements for becoming a Party Member: (1) devotion to the revolutionary cause; (2) obedience to the regulations, constitution, and discipline of the Party; (3) to fight furiously and boldly and to believe in self-sacrifice for the cause; (4) to suffer hardships without complaint and be a model soldier at all times; (5) to overcome difficulties under any circumstance; and (6) to struggle against "bad thoughts." (No. 21, Item 19)¹¹

Former Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA) officers, members of religious organizations, and men with bad conduct records are not accepted as applicants unless they have "reformed" and are recommended by two Party members.

The duties of the Party member are specific, militant, and aggressive.


All Party members will assume the responsibility for making non-Party members work and fight by means of deliberate propaganda. By showing their determination to hold the position, Party members will inspire the others. Should the commanders be killed or wounded, Party members must take over command. (No. 21, Item 19)¹¹

The extent to which this surveillance is carried out may be illustrated from the following extract from a report on soldiers' behavior in action sent by an NKA battalion political officer to his regimental superior on 20 January 1951.

(1) Sqd ldr...kicked his men, 25 Jan 51. (2) Pvt...after recovering from his wound, does not show enthusiasm in drill and also complains about everything, 24 Jan 51. (3) Pvt...said that he used to be a member of the Korean Young Men's Assoc. in Seoul, 24 Jan 51. (4) Sqd ldr...beat his men because they did not give him enough chicken, and because they did not dry his wet pants, 25 Jan 51. (5) Bn CO...retreated ahead of his men when his battalion retreated, 5 Feb 51. (6) The 2nd Plt ldr...lost track of his men when they climbed a mountain, but he did not make any attempt to find them, 5 Feb 51. (7) Bn CO...complained about a meal, 30 Jan 51. (8) Sr adj...did not execute any of his duties; he merely slept, 30 Jan 51. (9) Bn CO...confiscated civilian property violating military regulations, 28 Jan 51. (No. 14, Item 4)¹¹

It has been mentioned that the political organization extends to sub-squad units or cells. In each squad, members are divided into groups of three or four, each with a group leader. These groups meet daily for discussion, mutual criticism, self-criticism, and other functions, which are described in Chapter V.

All of the foregoing illustrates the essentially political nature of the CCF and NKA; this is the first important fact to be understood in attempting to assess the Communist will-to-fight. The significance of politics in the CCF can be illustrated by pointing out that "proper and effective" combat performance is practically synonymous with "proper and correct" political beliefs. For example, if a combat rifleman does not perform adequately in battle,



his political views are more likely to be investigated than are his skill, training, or military leadership. The wish to desert and the fear of death or injury are likewise traced, in the Communist way of thinking, to one's ideological beliefs and attitudes.

Within this framework the next chapters examine the general efforts of the CCF to promote high morale and the specific techniques utilized by them to promote the will-to-fight of the infantry rifleman.



CHAPTER III

POLITICAL TRAINING OR INDOCTRINATION*

SCOPE

An important factor in the matter of constantly increasing the combat preparation of our troops is the ideological-political training for enlisted personnel. The experience acquired during the Great Patriotic War, and that acquired during the post-war period of development of the Soviet Army shows clearly that the higher the ideological-political level of our forces, the more thoroughly the men understand their tasks as defenders of the Socialist fatherland, and the better they fulfill their service obligations. Political training should be purposeful, realistic, and highly ideological. The duty of the commander is to make use of all the multitudinous forms of political propaganda, agitation, and party work activities so in order constantly to raise the quality of the military and political training for the troops (p. 13).¹²

This paragraph by a Russian general officer states the role of political training as seen by the Soviet Army. It also serves as a reasonably accurate statement of the point of view of the leaders of the CCF and NKA.

A dominant manifestation of the intimate relationship between the strictly military and the political phases of the CCF and NKA lies in the process of political training or indoctrination as carried out in these armies. Indoctrination is a process that runs through the whole of the soldier's military life. The present report is less concerned with the content of indoctrination in detail than with analyzing the extent and manner of the indoctrination process. This chapter deals with the more or less formal classroom type of indoctrination to which the soldier is exposed. This restriction is imposed merely for the sake of clarity of exposition; in practice and theory, formal indoctrination procedures cannot be separated from the rest of the political milieu, particularly as far as the exposed individual is concerned.

There is no question that indoctrination in the CCF and NKA never ceases. Estimates of the proportion of total service time

*The terms "political training" and "indoctrination" will be used interchangeably in this report.

[REDACTED]

involved, based on interrogations in this study, range from one-third to two-thirds, with 50 percent as typical, especially in basic training. Instructors are the company political officer and the company cultural officer. The procedure is for the company to be given a lecture after which the members are split into smaller groups (squads) for discussion. As far as can be determined, all recruits (except for ex-CNA)* receive the same basic political training. During unit training those whose thoughts are slow in changing are given more indoctrination than the others. During combat, indoctrination occupies no fixed time but continues as opportunity permits. As one battalion-grade political officer stated: "Indoctrination during basic and unit training builds up the foundation of soldiers' thoughts; in combat, indoctrination develops and operates." (No. 73)⁶

The four CCF political and cultural officers interrogated were asked how much importance the CCF attached to the indoctrination functions as compared with skill training. Three replied that political indoctrination was far more important; one, that they were of equal importance. These replies reinforce the impression gained from the amount of time spent in political training: the difference in emphasis between the CCF and the US Army is striking.

PRIOR INDOCTRINATION

Most of the POWs in this study (82 percent of the CCF and 72 percent of the NKA) reported having received no political indoctrination prior to entering their present Army. The six CCF POWs who had had indoctrination, reported a very small amount of exposure: occasional village meetings while a farmer; ten hours while a CNA POW; unspecified time while a CNA POW; one month while a CNA POW; one month in "liberated unit"; three weeks under KMT.

For all practical purposes, those who received indoctrination as CNA POWs or as members of "liberated units" were in the CCF at the time. This means that only two of the 45 had received indoctrination prior to the CCF, according to their own report. Answers were not obtained from two CCF POWs.

Five or 28 percent of the NKA POWs had received prior indoctrination: no formal indoctrination, but exposed in school; at school

*If he were an ex-CNA soldier the pattern would be much more heavily in favor of political training. Special efforts were made to indoctrinate this group along the lines indicated later.

[REDACTED]

three times a week for two years in social study class; twenty days training as a school teacher on socialism, ethics, philosophy; meetings of "Peoples Youth League" twice a week; "Youth League" meetings for one year.

By and large, then, this sample of POWs entered the Army with no Communist political indoctrination. Whether typical or not, from the point of view of this study this is a favorable situation, in that their evaluations of the effects of indoctrination are based on indoctrination within the context of the Army. As the Communist regimes solidify their acquired territories, future soldiers will be more likely to have been indoctrinated prior to military service.

EX-CNA PERSONNEL

For ex-CNA personnel, especially officers and particularly those who were politically "backward," indoctrination is much more extensive and intensive. Prisoners frequently reported full-time political training for three months (Nos. 86, 1037, 1127);¹⁰ eight months (Nos. 329, 1065, 331);¹⁰ a year or more (Nos. 50, 952);¹⁰

Classroom lectures were usually followed by squad discussion. Each student gave his opinion of lecture content and the squad leader determined the extent to which he had absorbed the indoctrination. (No. 598)¹⁰ Topics emphasized include:

(a) "Development of Democracy" — course encouraged them to state their opinions freely [*sic*] during small group discussions. (b) "Land Reform" — to convince POWs that CCF policy better than CNA. (c) "Debt Collection" — one should fight the "old society" of grafters, etc. (d) "Honesty and Complaints" — encouraged to confess "fault" of fighting vs CCF. Describe hardships under landlords and CNA officers. Criticize family if wealthy. (e) "Elimination of Seeds of Discontent" — overthrow Kuomintang. (f) "Study of Communism" — history of CCP. (g) "Loyalty" — promotions promised to loyal CCF soldiers. Confidence in CCF also emphasized. (No. 50)¹⁰

A comparison of the basic differences between CCF and CNA was made during classes and during group discussions at squad meetings. The differences discussed were those relating to discipline, planning military operations, participation in expenditure of unit funds, and officer-enlisted men relations. (No. 1119)¹⁰

From several independent documents (Nos. 1037, 1065, 1127, 1272)¹⁰ the following training schedule for ex-CNA personnel appears to be typical:

0600	Reveille
0615 - 0800	Physical training
0800 - 0900	Breakfast

[REDACTED]

0900 - 1130 Political training
1130 - 1230 Lunch
1230 - 1600 Political lectures and discussion
1600 - 1700 Supper
1700 - 1800 Recreation
1800 - 1930 Political training
1930 - 2100 Discussion and criticism
2100 Taps

Focal points of all training in the CCF are the "Three Main Points of Discipline" and the "Eight Items of Instruction."

The "Three Main Points of Discipline": (1) all orders are to be obeyed; (2) no illegal confiscation of personal property of civilians; (3) all war booty must be handed over to the proper authorities.

The "Eight Items of Instruction": (1) fair barter with civilians; (2) friendly attitude toward civilians; (3) return of all articles borrowed from civilians; (4) reimbursement for any damages to borrowed articles; (5) not to beat or scold others; (6) not to damage crops grown by civilians; (7) to be courteous and dignified with females; (8) decent treatment of POWs. (No. 844)¹⁰

REASON FOR FIGHTING

The major theme of the indoctrination message is: "We are fighting to save China (Korea) from the American imperialists." One CCF rifleman had this to say regarding political training for enlisted men:

The CCF soldier received his will to fight through political training. Training for EM was different from that for officers because of their different backgrounds and educational level. Political training for officers emphasized Communist theories, but for EM the training was based upon propaganda and was presented in such a manner as to make the men believe that they were being attacked and oppressed by capitalistic forces. (No. 1056)¹⁰

One CCF political booklet contains the following rationale for indoctrination:

Complete indoctrination was carried out prior to combat to stimulate in all ranks the desire to achieve success in their first battle in Korea, to intensify the hatred toward the US Imperialists based on the "Anti-US; pro Korea" indoctrination of past months. (No. 47, Item 2)¹¹

The topics covered in a CCF Army Group Political Department pamphlet speak for themselves:

(1) the fantastic and crafty American bandit participating in the truce talks; (2) the American bandit is a deadly enemy of the Chinese people; (3) the American bandit is a deadly enemy of the Korean people; (4) the American bandit is a deadly enemy of the peoples of the world; (5) annihilate the people's deadly enemy - the American bandit. (No. 66, Item 42)¹¹

NATURE OF THE ENEMY

The second major theme of political indoctrination concerned the nature of the enemy, particularly the US. POWs interrogated in the study were asked: "What were you told were the strengths and weaknesses of US Forces? Of ROK Forces?" The responses are tabulated in Table 1 in terms of frequency of mention rather than by individual POWs. Thirteen of the CCF and 11 of the NKA POWs did not respond to the question concerning the US. Twenty-six of the CCF and 15 of the NKA POWs had no response to the ROKA question. From the remaining POWs the responses listed in Table 1 were obtained.

Certain generalizations might be made within this sample.

a. Both CCF and NKA soldiers were told that the major weakness of the US Army lies in the individual soldier, his lack of bravery, and his soft living.

b. Both CCF and NKA soldiers were told that the major strength of the US Army lies in its resources and support, particularly air and artillery support, and generally superior weapons and equipment.

c. In contrast to the US Army, the ROKA is said to have a source of strength in its individual soldier as well as in strong equipment and material support.

d. With respect to the US, the prisoners mention weaknesses more frequently than strengths; with respect to the ROKA, strengths were mentioned more frequently.

It is a temptation to believe that the POWs held these views as their own. The data do not support this conclusion in that the POWs were asked only what they were told about strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces. It is not unlikely, however, that a positive relationship exists in this instance between exposure and belief.

The four CCF political and cultural officers were asked: "What were your soldiers told were the strengths and weaknesses of US Forces? Of ROK Forces?" Their replies are tabulated in Table 2.

Further evidence on the indoctrination received concerning the nature of the enemy has been obtained from captured enemy documents and other interrogations. Herewith are extracts from a CCF divisional pamphlet on "A Typical US Infantry Company" dated 28 July 1951:

A. Foreword.

In the war against the US Forces, we naturally feel that their equipment is good and their firepower strong. However, the degree of importance that should be attached to this superiority is a question that needs a concise and concrete answer.

Since a rifle company is a basic tactical unit, and tactics depend on the men who operate the weapons, the equipment and technical status are of secondary importance.

[REDACTED]

Therefore, we will take a US rifle company, "L" Co (12th Co), 9th Regt, US 2d Div, as an example, in order to give a concrete answer.

We have experienced the superiority of enemy equipment, but, on the other hand, we should also be aware of the fact that *the political quality of the American soldiers who use these superior weapons, is very different from ours.* [Author's italics] Owing to this fact, the enemy's fighting capacity is limited to a war of attrition either offensive or defensive, and they are incapable of fighting a war of annihilation. The past six months of actual fighting have proved, and coming operations will continue to prove this point.

Since coming to KOREA, the officers and men of the [] company have felt more and more homesick and war weary. They are very much in doubt as to "what they are here for," and "what they are fighting for." The men often ask about the rotation system, and wonder whether there is any chance of being reassigned to noncombat duty. They often wonder how many more months they must stay in KOREA, what the treatment would be if they were wounded, and whether there is any chance of going home.

The Company Commander is often asked such questions even when checking sentries or assigning duties. It is hard for him to answer, so he may finally say, "I don't know any more than you do."

Owing to the low morale, dozens of men have intentionally injured themselves; seven have deserted, of which only one was apprehended and the other six are still missing. They fire rifles senselessly and throw hand grenades, or straggle during the march, disobey orders, handle weapons, and equipment carelessly. (No. 68, Item 17)¹¹

Another Chinese booklet, dated 29 March 1951, is titled "A Collection of Combat Experience." It has this to say about the US Army:

1. US Strong Points: (a) precise air artillery and tank coordination, and extremely orderly joint operations; (b) technical standard of firearms; (c) shifting of artillery fire; (d) high mobility; (e) firepower; (f) skillful in dispersion, concealment, and ambush.
2. US Weak Points: (a) weak infantry combat spirit; (b) unfamiliar with mountain warfare and mountain climbing; (c) not accustomed to close combat; (d) unfamiliar with night operations; (e) not suited to mobile warfare in mountain areas; (f) afraid of being cut off in the rear; (g) morale is too low. (No. 47, Item 10)¹¹

An individual Chinese soldier had penned the following in his notebook which was captured on 20 March 1952:

- (1) They are afraid of our hand grenades, which would blast them into bits.
- (2) They are afraid of bayonet assaults, and they become meek and nervous before our bayonets.
- (3) They are afraid of bangalore torpedoes, which would paralyze their tanks.
- (4) They are afraid of surprise attacks, which they could hardly escape and survive.
- (5) They are afraid of night operations, for they would be at a loss in the dark.
- (6) They are afraid of close combat, for their planes and artillery would become useless.
- (7) They are afraid of mountain climbing ability, for we might appear suddenly before them.
- (8) They are afraid of encircling and netting tactics, for they would be trapped like lambs.
- (9) They are afraid of thrust and penetration, for they would be cut into vulnerable segments.
- (10) They are afraid of night raids on their encampments, for they would be killed before they could get dressed. (No. 80, Item 50)¹¹

These documents corroborate the POW reports and indicate that the indoctrination message with respect to the US enemy is consistent. To the extent that it is also a valid reflection of the US infantry soldier, it suggests further study on US training and motivation.

[REDACTED]

TABLE 1

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF US AND ROKA
FORCES MENTIONED BY CCF AND NKA RIFLEMEN

Item	Frequency of mention		
	CCF	NKA	Total
<u>US Weaknesses</u>			
Individual soldier			
Afraid to fight, cowardly	6	4	
Used to easy life	5	1	
Afraid of death	4	3	
Weak (poor) in combat	4	1	
Playboys and dandies	3		
Homesick	2		
Less brave	2		
Low morale	1		
Retreat or surrender when commander killed or wounded	1	1	
Total mentions	28	10	38
Training and tactics			
Poor night fighters	3		
Not well dispersed	3		
Not trained to difficult terrain	3		
Abandon positions when enemy too close	2		
Lack of combat experience	2		
Infantry unit not as strong as CCF unit	2		
Not used to walking	1		
Poor in-fighters	1		
Poor infiltration and ambush tactics	1		
Lack of combat training	1	1	
Lack of tactical training	1		
Trigger happy	1		
Infantry troops weak		1	
Weak on surprise attack		1	
Not good in winter warfare		1	
Total mentions	21	4	25

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Item	Frequency of mention		
	CCF	NKA	Total
<u>US Weaknesses (Cont'd)</u>			
Resources and support			
Manpower in reserve small	3		
Supply difficult	1		
Total mentions	4	0	4
Total weaknesses			67
<u>US Strengths</u>			
Resources and support			
Superior airpower	12		
Superior artillery	11		
Best weapons	6	4	
Well mechanized	5		
Best equipment	4	3	
Superior tanks	2		
Strong firepower	1		
Good automatic weapons	1		
Well trained, equipped, and supplied	1		
Very efficient transportation and communication	1		
Total mentions	44	7	51
Total strengths			51
<u>ROKA Weaknesses</u>			
Same as US	2		
Individual soldier			
Infantry weak	2		
Nothing to be afraid of		1	
Total mentions	2	1	3
Training and tactics			
Not well dispersed	1		
New draftees without training	1		
Lack of fighting technique		1	
EM-O relationship bad		1	
Total mentions	2	2	4

[REDACTED]

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Item	Frequency of mention		
	CCF	NKA	Total

ROKA Weaknesses (Cont'd)

Resources and support			
Manpower in reserve small	1		
Low in food	1		
Total mentions	2	0	2
Total weaknesses			9

ROKA Strengths


Same as US	2		
Same as CCF	2		
Individual soldier			
Braver and stronger than US	5		
Fighting will stronger than US	3	1	
Courageous	1	2	
Total mentions	9	3	12
Training and tactics			
Hardest to deal with (formal Japanese tactics)	1		
Total mentions	1	0	1
Resources and support			
Superior airpower	3		
Superior artillery	2		
Stronger firepower	2		
Better communications	1		
Better weapons	1		
Strong support of US artillery	1		
Well equipped		1	
Total mentions	10	1	11
Total strengths			24

[REDACTED]

It is quite likely that there is more than a small element of validity in the foregoing picture of the US soldier. Current research on the combat behavior of the US soldier indicates that he is critically weak and vulnerable in some of the ways believed by the enemy. Where the lack of US fighting spirit is obvious, the enemy is in a strong position to establish credence for the rest of its indoctrination message.

TABLE 2
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
OF US AND ROKA FORCES MENTIONED
BY CCF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL OFFICERS

	Strengths	Weaknesses
US	Strong firepower; well trained in modern warfare.	Afraid of night combat and hand to hand combat. In- sufficient courage after being surrounded. Not willing to fight in Korea, used to easy life. Supply line too long. Play boys.
ROKA	More stubborn.	Tactics too mechanized and not clever.



CHAPTER IV

GENERAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE HIGH MORALE

The CCF is not unaware of the importance of individual and group morale in molding an effective fighting force. Such efforts as are made are not necessarily unique among armed forces in general, but do possess some historically unique features for the armies in question. This report views the CCF and NKA doctrine aimed at raising morale through troop management as part of the larger picture of indoctrination. Certainly the practices and policies reviewed here are consistent with the total ideological framework within which these armies operate.

EFFORTS TO RAISE SOCIAL PRESTIGE

For thousands of years the ordinary Chinese soldier stood at the bottom of the social ladder, along with beggars and thieves. An ancient Chinese proverb typified this traditional attitude: "Good iron is not used to make a nail; neither is a good man used to made a soldier."⁵

The CCF has put great emphasis on raising the status of the common soldier, and under the Communists, the soldier in China is probably better off than he ever was.

Cultural Education

Related to the general effort to raise the social status of the soldier is the cultural and educational program laid down in 1950. The Chinese are an illiterate people; estimates on illiteracy range from about 50 percent to well above that figure. The program laid down by the CCF required the soldier to devote from 70 to 80 percent of his time to educational subjects (No. 1102).^{10,18} By this plan it was contemplated that all soldiers reach at least a primary school education level in three years (No. 1102).¹⁰ The program was interrupted by the Chinese decision to enter the Korean war, and education was cut down to a minimum of two hours a day. Emphasis in the

[REDACTED]

program is on reading and writing and is primarily the responsibility of the unit cultural officer.

Literacy and knowledge are respected in China. The increased literacy rate in the Army should bring about increased respect for and self-respect on the part of the soldier, and, at the same time, open further avenues for communicating the indoctrination message.

Military-Civilian Relationships

In order to further raise the prestige of the soldier, and facilitate the accomplishment of over-all military and political goals, the CCF has worked hard, and successfully, at improving the relationship between the military and civilians. As a result, cooperation is now common as it never was in the past. The CCF is trying to foster the conception of the soldier as the friend of the people. There is close regulation and control of contacts with civilians, and offenders are severely punished. This is in contrast with previous military regimes where civilians were considered "fair game."

EFFORTS TO CREATE A DEMOCRATIC ARMY

The CCF and NKA identify themselves as armies of the people, and make every effort to give their establishments the trappings of democracy. As a first step, efforts are made to convince the recruit that he is joining the Army on a purely voluntary basis, whether he is or not. Although conscripted by persuasion, propaganda, and organized social pressure rather than by force, the recruit is officially regarded and treated as a volunteer. From this time on he "appears" to be participating in the administration of the unit and in decision-making.

Other egalitarian devices (for so they appear from the outside) include the minimization of caste differences between ranks with the issuance of a common uniform for all, and the abolition of ranks in the CCF (e.g., squad leader rather than sergeant, company commander rather than captain).

EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AN IMPROVED DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM

Arbitrary and sadistic physical punishment has been replaced by an attempt to utilize behavior violations for the purpose of

[REDACTED]

further indoctrination and the development of democratic practices. Minor violations are handled at a low military echelon with fellow soldiers appearing to participate in the determination of punishment. The criticism meeting (see Chapter V) plays an important role here and may well be more effective in bringing about conformity than punishment as traditionally conceived. Incorporated in the disciplinary system is the possibility of redeeming oneself by admitting guilt and promising to do better.

As has been noted (Chapter II), deviations from approved behavior are viewed in a political light. The following excerpts from an order concerning punishments for offenses committed, issued by the Political Section of a CCF division, illustrates the manner in which punishment is viewed.


During the [] campaign, there were many officers who sacrificed themselves daringly and courageously to accomplish the mission... In spite of these men, however, there were a few officers who failed to recognize the magnificence of the purpose of "resistance to the US and help to Korea" but persisted in individualism and demonstrated their rightist inclinations, fear of death, etc. All the above mentioned offenses were due primarily to confused ideas on internationalism, lack of "sense of class," and lack of contributions to the party, and people.... (No. 15, Item 18)¹¹

One POW sheds an interesting light on the difference between discipline in the CNA and the CCF:

You know, I was only three months in the CNA, but it was quite a different army than the CCF. The CNA was strict and tried to teach the men something, and when a soldier was as dumb and difficult as I was, he would be beaten. Then I would worry about being beaten and never learn anything. But the CCF was lenient and didn't try to teach the men anything so I was much happier and (chuckle) I didn't learn any less. (No. 702187)⁹

RAND Report RM 902³ treats in detail these and other facets of the CCF designed to promote morale. Some of the others include the effort to create units of a homogeneous ethnic base and the provision of a secure material basis of existence.

These general efforts represent basic policies for morale building and tend to create a climate in which group solidarity can flourish.



CHAPTER V

SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES TO PROMOTE WILL-TO-FIGHT

This chapter contains an account of techniques utilized by the CCF and NKA more or less specifically for the purpose of promoting and ensuring effective performance in all phases of soldiering. Some of the techniques have been observed in the USSR Army, but expert observers have testified that these Oriental armies have carried them further, perfected them, and applied them more vigorously and thoroughly than the Soviets. To understand them, it is necessary to know the cultural and political milieu in which they operate; they are an integral part of that milieu.

"SPEAK-BITTERNESS"

"Speak-bitterness" is a theme centering around the injustices, cruelties, and mistreatment suffered by the soldier, his family, and others under the previous Chinese Nationalist Government (CNG) regime. A meeting is held during which individuals are encouraged to relate in public their past sufferings. Sometimes older men and women are brought in from civil life to tell the group of the cruel way in which they had been treated by the former regime. The meeting is usually accompanied by a great deal of outward emotionality (e.g., weeping). "Speak-bitterness" was reported as having been experienced by 63 percent of the CCF POWs and 11 percent of the NKAs in this study. These meetings typically took place before (or early in) basic training and again in combat, although a few reported such sessions during unit training. The "speak-bitterness" meeting is apparently the initial phase of the indoctrination program and attempts to create a receptive attitude toward subsequent indoctrination content.* The new recruit usually underwent such sessions for a full week, eight

*This is similar to the process popularly known as "brain-washing."

[REDACTED]

hours a day in groups of company and, sometimes, platoon size. "Liberated" CNAs were exposed to a much more extensive period. (See Chapter III.)

An impression of the "speak-bitterness" procedure may be gained from the following POW statement:

POW experienced the method once during basic training. The sessions were scheduled two to four hours daily and lasted two weeks. At the first stage of the session, soldiers spoke their bitterness one by one in squad meetings. The "bitterness" usually included how one was "squeezed" by a CNA official, how he was forced into the reactionary army (CNA), how his crop was deprived by the landlord, etc. An individual of deep "bitterness," usually a Party member or Youth Corps, could speak so "bitter" that made him finally crying. The bitterness of each member of the squad was then recorded by cultural chief elected among fellow members. After each soldier of each squad of the battalion completed his "bitterness-speak," a "great bitterness-speak" of the whole battalion was then held with the attendance of the regimental commanding officer, regimental political commissar, and regimental chief of staff. The most bitter records were then read by battalion CO or company CO to all the soldiers. Finally, comments were given by the regimental officers. A typical comment was like this: Since the landlords, reactionaries, and bureaucrats were all squeezing on us we must turn them down. After the great session was over, the squad meetings were held again to discuss which one of the soldiers had suffered most bitterness, and how to revenge for those comrades who had been bitterly squeezed. (No. 719550)⁵

During the squad discussion period, each individual was expected to participate actively; if he did not, he received extra individual instructions from the political officer who made his rounds of the squads during the discussion. The soldier was asked to narrate his life under the CNG and compare it with the good points under the Chinese Communist Government (CCG). Sometimes this comparison was assisted by the political officer. Anyone who appeared to be unmoved was pointed out by the company political officer, questioned as to why he was indifferent to the mishaps of the poor, and told to think it over so that he might be able to correct his wrong attitude. The main purpose of these sessions is to create a feeling of deep hatred toward all that is anti-Communist.

A number of respondents mentioned the speaker and audience breaking into tears. The political officer seizes upon such an opportunity to reinforce indoctrination by asking the soldiers why they are fighting. There is evidence from these interrogations that all tears are not shed in genuine sympathy. One POW (No. 719615)⁶ commented that there were many in the group who wept just to go along with the ceremony. Another (No. 8)⁶ said that at times the listeners buried their heads on their arms pretending they were sorry for the past sufferings of others. Laughing or boredom was prohibited.

Another note of weakness in the technique may be found in this remark of a POW, "Most of the ones who wept after listening to

[REDACTED]

the descriptions were utilizing this chance to lament over the miserable life they had to live under the Chinese Communist Government ruling, which otherwise they would not dare to express openly." (No. 719628)⁶ This is a most significant statement and makes good sense psychologically. It would be ironic if the Communists were thus providing their soldiers with an opportunity for emotional expression of their negative feelings centered around the Communist regime.

"Speak-bitterness" was far less frequent in the NKA sample than in the CCF; the basis of "bitterness" in the NKA was also different. According to one NKA POW, these sessions were generally based on GHQ dispatches which elaborated on UN brutalities (e.g., germ warfare). These dispatches were read to the group and opinions were then solicited as to methods by which such savagery could be combatted. Fanatical methods were first suggested by the CP members and continued until every member of the meeting was stimulated to the maximum. "These meetings generally ended in a frenzy." (No. 147621)⁶

The content of the "speak-bitterness" session appears amenable to modification to suit the sensitivities of the particular cultural group. The North Koreans apparently did not attack the previous (non-Communist) regime as much as they attacked the UN, particularly the US.

CHALLENGE OR COMPETITION SYSTEM

Sixty percent of the CCF POWs and 22 percent of the NKAs reported having seen the personal or group challenge technique in operation. They reported consistently that it is used generally throughout the service in connection with performing any task, be it building a bunker, meeting a training standard, or performing a combat mission. The technique is constantly encouraged by the company political officer. Such challenges are most frequently between squads but may also be between individuals or between companies.

The typical procedure is for a squad leader to challenge other squads by saying, for example, "My squad can complete the bunker within ten days." Another squad leader will respond, "My squad will complete the same work within nine days." Then another squad leader may say "My squad challenges you to eight days." The challenge may be written and signed by all members of the challenger's team and submitted through channels to be read by

[REDACTED]

the Company Commander and responded to at roll call. Once a week the "best squad in the company" is chosen and announced in front of the entire company by the Company Commander. An individual or unit that possessed an honorary title such as "model fighter" or "model squad" was frequently the object of the challenge.

One POW (No. 719625)⁶ noted that the challenge system led to the accomplishment of goals through seemingly voluntary participation rather through rigid orders and supervision from above. For example, a company or battalion commander who wanted his men to keep their weapons clean would announce this general goal, but instead of giving orders, would promote an opportunity for one individual to challenge another as to who would clean his weapons better, faster, more often. The challenged soldier must respond or even make a counter-challenge. Through a series of competitive challenges, the weapons of individual soldiers were kept clean.

Another example of the utilization of the challenge system to simulate the democratic process and to commit individuals to a specific pattern of behavior is revealed in the following account related by a CCF cultural instructor:

Prior to the announcement of the movement of troops into Korea, a soldier in a company said that he would like to go to Korea to fight against the US and would like to see if there were others who dared to go. Usually the soldier pointed out a certain individual and challenged him with the idea. Using the psychological principle that nobody wanted to show his cowardice, this challenge resulted in the whole company volunteering for the Korean War. Then there were challenges among battalions, regiments, and divisions. Eventually, the whole Army became volunteers, petitioning to be sent to Korea. (No. 732676)⁶

The strength of this technique lies in the twin facts that the soldier cannot honorably refuse a challenge, and once personally committed must follow through, lest he lose face among his peers.

PLEDGE-SIGNING

Pledge-signing was reported as having been observed by 67 percent of the CCF respondents and 22 percent of the NKAs, although not all of these had actually signed such a pledge themselves. In fact, they reported that pledge-signing is not universally employed throughout the Army. It seems to take place typically two or three times in a soldier's career--at induction and prior to any major combat mission. A few soldiers reported the technique as being used "occasionally" or "whenever a mission was assigned." It is encouraged by the political officer.

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The signing seems to take place in large groups of 100 or so and is not a technique used before each small engagement or patrol. Illiterate soldiers are helped by a buddy to write out a pledge or by a prepared form which they sign.

Pledges are usually directed toward work or combat. They consist of a number of "assuring" items signed by each member of a squad and turned over to the company commander or political officer. The assuring item in basic training might have the theme, "anti-America and assist Korea." In Korea, the theme might be "to fight to the death and not to surrender." One POW listed the following items that were "hinted by the political officer of the company." "Not to drink unprocessed water in order to keep health for combat; not to surrender to hardships; not to complain when suffering; to take good care of his weapon and equipment" (No. 719627).⁶

Sometimes pledge-signing was the climax to the "speak-bitterness" session. One POW stated that after such a session everyone signed "not necessarily out of sincerity, but to ward off suspicion." (No. 719615)⁶ Although signing is not compulsory, several POWs mentioned that non-signers would be punished if they didn't subsequently do a good job.

Pledge-signing was much more popular with Communist Party soldiers than non-Party soldiers. The former would occasionally donate their pay to purchase weapons, thus demonstrating their faith and loyalty to the CCF and setting an example for others to follow. Some literally signed their pledge in their own blood. "This was most favored by the political officers as it showed more weight." (No. 719625)⁶

From captured documents it seems that signing pledges was not always as voluntary a matter as it appeared to be to the individual soldier, at least in the NKA. In October 1950, Kim Il Sung issued a TOP SECRET document ordering all NKA to stand firm on penalty of death. In transmitting and implementing this order a Chief of Internal Security had this to add:

Activities of Political Officers are of particular importance. Each platoon will hold indoctrination meetings on a regular schedule; here defeatists and complainers will be attacked with ruthless criticism. This instruction applies equally to troops in mountains and remote areas not yet in direct combat with the enemy. As soon as the Supreme Commander's order reaches such units, each platoon will hold a meeting and a resolution on a sworn statement will be approved in response to the order. [They] must contain expressions of determination to fight to the end. (No. 19, Item 2)¹¹

As in the challenge system, the enemy here capitalizes on the face-saving theme which appears to be very important to some Oriental peoples.

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CRITICISM MEETING

The criticism meeting is the most universal of the techniques studied. Ninety-five percent of the CCF and 56 percent of the NKAs reported having participated in such meetings. Of these, practically all said that the meetings were held every night in squad-size groups, while a few reported meetings as infrequently as every three days or once a week; in general, it is clear that this criticism technique is an integral part of the soldier's life. As one soldier reported, it is "more or less a habit." A cultural instructor (No. 732676)⁶ reported that there was a common saying in the CCF that "Self-criticism is the best weapon for Marxism-Leninism."

It is difficult to separate the "criticism" from other types of meetings such as "speak-bitterness," indoctrination, struggle, challenge, etc. Nonetheless, the criticism meeting has some unique features and will be treated in some detail not only because of its universality in these armies, but also, and perhaps more important, because it seems to be one of the most significant elements in the array of motivating agents.

The criticism meeting involves primarily self-criticism but also participation in criticizing others. The individual self-criticizer (a) analyses his incorrect thoughts or action; (b) analyzes the influence of these acts if not corrected; (c) admits his errors; (d) seeks way to redeem himself through confession; and (e) promises to correct his ways. These quotations are typical of many obtained from POWs in this study.

Self-criticism was a handy weapon of the communists and was applied regardless of time, place, and the importance of the matter. However, the method was simple. Whenever a soldier committed a mistake, he was called to criticize himself as to how he did commit a mistake, what he thought was wrong, and how he guaranteed not to make the same mistake in the future. It was usually done in a squad meeting. If the person's self-critique was considered "not enough," he would be criticized by his fellow soldiers until he criticized himself satisfactorily. (No. 719550)⁶

Self-criticism was used along with criticizing others as a means to facilitate political indoctrination as well as a means to develop individual's eloquence and ability of argument. By encouraging, sometimes enforcing individuals, to criticize themselves, the CCF authorities achieved in preparing defenseless minds into which the Communist way of thinking could easily be transplanted. The method of self-criticism also prepared the ground for a thorough union of individual soldiers, since there was no room for the growth of individualism of any sort. (No. 719510)⁶

As with "speak-bitterness," the pattern of criticism in the NKA seems less frequent and is different from that in the CCF as may be seen from these excerpts from NKA interrogations.

[REDACTED]

This session, excluded from political indoctrination, was held either once or twice monthly separately by company, platoon, or squad, supervised by the company, platoon, and squad leaders. During the session, men whose conduct was wrong (sleeping on guard duty, etc.), were indicated and were compelled to make confessions on their conduct and make statements of not repeating such conduct again. Men with good conduct also were picked out and praised by the commanders. Usually this session was humorous and the most enjoyable and popular session in the POW's company. (No. 41)⁶

Topics for the sessions were generally along the line of UN brutality, but, subsequently, it turned to individual personalities. The speaker, usually the platoon leader, would state that what was done in the past would be forgiven immediately if a confession was made in the presence of everybody. Those who were self-conscious such as former UN affiliated "self-security force" would confess what they had done. They would state that they would mend their ways and fight until death for the Communist cause. (No. 147621)⁶ (Interrogators note: POWs stated that after these public confessions the confessor was secretly watched thereafter.)

Implicit in the Communist principle and practice of criticism is surveillance. The CCF troops in Korea probably have been subjected to closer surveillance for evidence of incorrect thought or behavior than any troops in history. There is abundant evidence that the soldiers believe unanimously that their every action is watched. Criticism is perhaps most effective as a behavior deterrent when the feeling prevails that one cannot "get away with it."

The impact of criticism on the Chinese individual can only be understood and appreciated in terms of Chinese values and culture. The overwhelming majority of CCF soldiers interrogated in this and other studies report these meetings to be uncomfortable, unpleasant, and humiliating. Although a Westerner may have difficulty in appreciating the concept fully, awareness of the necessity to "save face" in China must precede any understanding of the dynamic role of the criticism meeting.

POST-COMBAT CRITIQUES*

Critiques were mentioned by only 23 percent of the CCF POWs and none of the North Koreans. However, it should be noted that many of these prisoners were captured during their first battle and therefore could not have experienced a post-battle critique.

From the information that could be gathered, it appears that post-battle critiques occurred after each engagement in each company, conducted by the company commander and political officer. A soldier was picked out from among the group to express the weak points during combat and the strong points of the

* Sometimes called "recognition meetings" in Korea.

[REDACTED]

enemy. Then the company commander and political officer criticized each point and lectured to the troops. The pledges signed before the battle were brought up at this time and discrepancies noted between pledges and performance. Those individuals who did well were rewarded; those who did poorly were criticized or even punished, depending upon the severity of the offense.

The reward system is elaborate and effective, deliberately and openly established to promote effective combat performance. Rewards range from material benefits such as toothbrushes, writing paper, and clothing to psycho-social rewards of increased honor to self, family, and unit. Unit awards may be such as learning a special marching song which cannot be used by any other unit. Just as the loss of face is painful, gaining face through public recognition of meritorious deeds is pleasurable. Each unit has a merit recorder; effective individuals and units are announced publicly after each combat mission. Rewards are accumulated in such a way that the soldier can build up his merits to acquire the highly prized title "Combat Hero." The CCF places great emphasis on its system of rewards and all available evidence indicates that "...the prospect of honor and material rewards for meritorious behavior holds a strong attraction for many CCF soldiers and motivates them in a fashion which would be unusual in the US Army."³

Punishment, although a deterrent to unapproved behavior, seems to be played down in the CCF in favor of emphasizing positive rewards. As noted in Chapter IV, physical punishment has been largely discarded; criticism seems to be more effective.* Severe offenses may be punished by demotion, taking away Party membership, or death.

Post-battle critiques are standard practice of virtually all armies. The unique feature of the CCF critique is its personal and political orientation. Individual errors are studied much more closely than tactical errors, and the offending individual is considered to have poorly developed political thoughts rather than to be deficient in skill or training.

A NOTE ON THE USE OF DRUGS

There is no evidence whatsoever that the CCF or NKA employed drugs or narcotics to stimulate their soldiers. None of

*Many POWs have commented that they would rather be beaten and have the offense wiped off their records than undergo criticism and accept the personal responsibility for reforming.

[REDACTED]

the POWs interrogated knew of such. At the time of the data collection for this study, there was considerable publicity about "drugged" Chinese soldiers. A US Army Medical Corps intelligence officer went to the front to investigate the report and reported to the author that there was no basis in fact for this rumor. The only evidence uncovered that even remotely approaches this are some captured instructions on the use of "marching pills":

Marching pills have been produced after extensive chemical research conducted by both Chinese and Western physicians and chemists. It is a fine medicine to have on hand to meet all emergencies. Quick results may be seen after taking only one dose. It is excellent for plague, cold, influenza, dizziness, and vomiting. From 20 to 30 of these pills may be taken at one time. In case of serious illness, repeat dosage after one hour if results are not evident. (No. 97, Item 41)¹¹

It has been suggested that the marching pill described bears a resemblance to one-tenth grain of APC in that repeated dosage has no deleterious effect.

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CHAPTER VI

EFFECTIVENESS OF METHODS

The effectiveness of the methods described in this study is more difficult to assess than the methods are to describe. At best, only indirect evidence is available. Present assessment is based upon all the data available from interrogations and documents, and occasionally upon clearly labelled theoretical speculation. The evidence from POWs interrogated in this study is based on a small sample for reasons stated elsewhere.* When added to evidence from other sources, however, a fairly consistent picture emerges.

One of the difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of the CCF and NKA methods is that the present subjects do not themselves represent the "hard core" of confirmed Communists. In this sense they may be said to represent a minimum as far as acceptance of Communist ideology is concerned.

GENERAL EVALUATION

At the end of the interview subject POWs were asked directly: "How effective was the indoctrination program[†] of your army in making you want to fight?" Their responses are tabulated in Table 3.

Table 3 indicates that 47 percent of both CCF and NKA POWs considered the indoctrination program to be at least fairly effective in making them want to fight. Responses indicating a general lack of effectiveness were reported by 53 percent of each group. There is no real difference between the proportion rating effectiveness favorably and those rating it unfavorably.

*See Appendix C.

[†]The phrase "indoctrination program" was not specifically defined for the POW since it was intended that he should evaluate all of his army's efforts to make him want to fight as *he himself* defined those efforts. Any imposed definition would have been too arbitrary for this purpose.

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[REDACTED]

Two of the CCF POWs who indicated lack of effectiveness in motivating them, added that the program was effective in motivating others as a whole. This may reflect an unwillingness, conscious or unconscious, to admit that they themselves were positively affected. In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that the data in Table 3 represent an underestimate of the effective-

TABLE 3
ENEMY RIFLEMEN'S EVALUATION OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION

Evaluation	CCF		NKA	
	N ^a		N ^a	
Positive				
Very effective	11		2	
Quite effective	6		1	
Fairly effective	3		5	
Total	20	(47%)	8	(47%)
Negative				
Not too effective	12		4	
Very ineffective	11		5	
Total	23	(53%)	9	(53%)
Grand Total	43	(100%)	17	(100%)

^aTwo CCF and one NKA POW did not respond.

ness of indoctrination. Those who felt that the indoctrination was effective may have been more likely to deny it in order to please their captors, while those who felt no effect would be more likely to express that feeling.

"EXPERT" EVALUATION

The four political and cultural officers were asked: "What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the indoctrination program and policies of your army as far as making the soldier want to fight is concerned?" Two replied "Very effective," one "Quite effective," and one "Fairly effective."

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These officers have a much more positive opinion of effectiveness than do the enlisted men. One can speculate either that they are in a better position to know, hence their estimates are more accurate, or that they are biased and personally involved, hence their evaluations are overestimates of the real situation.

EVALUATION OF SAMPLE SUB-GROUPS

It would seem reasonable to suppose that the effectiveness ratings shown in Table 3 would be, in part, a function of certain related variables within the sample. The following hypotheses concerning CCF POWs* were tested: (a) captured POWs would rate effectiveness differently than surrendered POWs; (b) ex-CNA POWs would rate effectiveness differently from POWs who had not served in the CNA; (c) POWs who had been in UN hands a relatively short period of time would rate effectiveness differently from older POWs. Table 4 suggests that none of these hypotheses is tenable

TABLE 4
EVALUATION OF SAMPLE SUB-GROUPS
(Tests of Certain Hypotheses)

Reaction to Indoctrination, %	Category		Status		Detention time	
	Cap.	Surr	Ex-CNA	No-CNA	1 mo	Over 1 mo
Favorable	47	46	54	35	50	50
Unfavorable	53	54	46	65	43	57

and that such differences as do occur on these breakdowns could reasonably be attributed to chance alone. The ratings obtained, then, do not appear to represent any obvious biases within the sample.

STRENGTHS OF METHODS OF MOTIVATING

Subject POWs were asked: "In what ways is the indoctrination program strong and effective?" Thirty-six percent of the CCF

*Hypothesis b does not apply to NKA POWs; the number of NKA POWs was too small to check hypotheses a and c.

[REDACTED]

and 50 percent of the NKA failed to respond or gave no opinion. This was an open-ended question, structured no further than the statement presented.

An analysis of the varied replies reveals that among the CCF responses the most frequently mentioned "strong point" is the indoctrination itself both in its content (why we are fighting and the barbarous nature of the enemy) and in its manner of presentation (constantly and skillfully). Second most frequently mentioned is the system of control, i.e., coercion and mutual surveillance. Pledge-signing, challenge, and criticism were mentioned by several, as were the general efforts of the CCF to raise morale through keeping the soldiers "informed," lack of physical punishment, reward, "good" discipline, and good treatment from the officers.

The "strong points" stated by the North Koreans consist almost entirely of the indoctrination message itself, instilling fear of a cruel, barbaric, inhuman US enemy. This is an interesting difference between the CCF and NKA. Virtually the only "strengths" mentioned by the NKA riflemen are negative.

The officers were asked: "In what ways do you think the indoctrination program is strong and effective?"

"The Party is the heart of the CCF. Political indoctrination is the blood which carries the impulses of this heart to the entire CCF. The functioning of the CCF depends on the strength and control of the heart." "Propaganda make troops believe that Communism is the only solution for making a country strong and they are fighting for people of China and Korea." "Control of individual way of thinking." "Modern drama and challenge system." "Close surveillance."

In another attempt to get at the effectiveness of indoctrination, the POWs were asked: "What most made you want to fight the UN Forces?" Sixty-five percent indicated in one way or another that they did not want to fight the UN Forces. Most of these simply said that they were forced to, they had no alternative, or that it was their duty and they had to obey orders. Eleven percent of the CCF and 44 percent of the NKA POWs failed to respond to the question. When these nonrespondents are eliminated from the totals, the percentages of CCF and NKA POWs who indicated no desire to fight the UN become 83 and 67 percent respectively. These percentages are not significantly different from one another.

Of the seven CCF soldiers who admitted a motivation to fight the UN, the major reason given was belief of the indoctrination message that they were fighting to prevent the Americans from invading their Chinese homeland. One POW was poor and wanted his family taken care of as the CP promised; one said he believed

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stories of American atrocities; and one expressed the motive of self-preservation. Of the four NKA soldiers who admitted willingness to fight the UN, the following reasons were given: Belief in indoctrination message, including UN atrocity stores, and exploitation of Korea by the US.

It would be naive to conclude that the responses obtained to this question indicate accurately the willingness to fight of the respondents. It is quite likely that a number of them would mask such former attitudes under questioning by their captors. The purpose of the question was not so much to determine the degree of "will-to-fight" as it was to obtain indices of the relative potency of the various factors contributing to this determination. Even this purpose was inadequately met.

Other clues as to elements of strength in the indoctrination program may be gleaned from intelligence documents. These documents, largely handwritten letters and diaries, indicate that those enemy soldiers who committed their thoughts to papers which subsequently fell into UN hands, mentioned UN atrocities and US imperialistic designs most frequently, and added that despite UN germ warfare, etc., morale was high.

WEAKNESSES OF METHODS OF MOTIVATING

Continuing the effort to assess the effectiveness of indoctrination, POWs were asked: "In what ways could the indoctrination training be improved?" It is perhaps optimistic to expect the average Chinese or NK rifleman to respond intelligently or creatively to a question as difficult as this. Assuming such an evaluative attitude is probably rare. The question was asked, however, on the hunch that some leads might be forthcoming. As might be expected 78 percent of the CCF and 50 percent of the NKA did not answer, or indicated that they had no idea.

Of those who did reply positively, the following are noted:

CCF: Delete obvious propaganda (lies); present more factual evidence (4); fewer political lectures and meetings (2); use more movies, drawings, and teach reading to illiterate soldiers (2); more indoctrination (1); promise rotation and insurance of living (1).

NKA: Present more known and tangible truths, rather than false propaganda and absurd lies and promises (6); teach Korean and Russian history in that order and then compare them (1); very good now; couldn't be improved (1); explain means of ultimate victory for NKA (1).

The recommendation made most consistently by POWs of both armies is to present fewer untruths and verify more statements in the indoctrination message. This suggests that the US Troop

[REDACTED]

Information and Education Program (TI&E) and Civil Information and Education Program (CI&E) might also improve their effectiveness by presenting credible statements and incontrovertible evidence of the truth of those statements.

When the officers were asked: "In what ways could the program be improved?" their customary facility of expression was lacking. Two had no opinion, one felt there was no room for improvement, the other had no idea because he followed strictly the programs sent down from a higher echelon.

Weaknesses in the fabric of the CCF and NKA may be noted in some of the captured enemy documents. Although not conclusive nor representative of the Army as a whole, these diaries and reports provide some interesting insights into the way some soldiers feel and how some commanders assess the situation.

The following remarks of despair are found in the diary of a CCF soldier:

What hell the present situation is. OK! hurry up and fight! Just get killed and that will be an end to it. We ought to figure out some way or other if we want to get back to China. I can no longer be a soldier like this: I would rather hang myself with a rope.

Go back to CHINA? It's not that easy! I do not even think of it now for there is not even the slightest chance of it, ever. There will be an end to it, as I will be killed sooner or later. (No. 2, Item 7)¹¹

A CCF Squad Leader had the following version of morale in his unit to report on 9 April 1952:

Morale of the unit was bad. Many of the men in the company were pro-CNA in their hearts and, like the POW, had no patriotism or love for the CCF. At least half the men in the company were in the Army because they had been drafted and they felt that as long as they could get three meals a day they would be content to remain in the unit, but they had no desire for actual combat.

The morale of the new recruits particularly was very low. These men between the ages of 18 and 30, although they were listed on the records as being "volunteers" were actually draftees, because they had been forced to enlist. Men of military age were called to service by their local draft boards but usually the men were able to get exemptions on one pretext or another. Some merely neglected to report. The same thing usually happened on the second call. However, if the men still refused to answer the third call, Communist leaders from the village went to the delinquent man's home to speak to him.

The lecture usually went as follows: "Are you a Communist or not? The country has given you a farmland, fed you, and stood you on your feet after the Nationalists made a slave of you. You, your parents, and your loved ones have been living on Communist charity for the past several years. You made CHINA Communist because under our constitution you are the leaders of the People's Government yet you refuse to serve your country, when it needs you most. If you do not want to fight for your heritage and your land, you are not a Communist. If you are a Communist, there is nothing to be said. You will join our cause. If you are not, we do not want people here who will resist the will of the People."

Under such threats, the men were forced to "volunteer" because any admission of anti-Communism would result in persecution and possible death for the individual and his loved ones.

POW heard many recruits crying softly at night from loneliness and despair, and believed that such men would never fight effectively in a crisis.

Even the experienced veterans who had served in the CCF for a number of years were sick of the oppression, distrust, and austerity demanded by the CCF. If two friends conversed for any length of time in a public place, they were suspected of hatching an anti-Communist plot. Once POW was called before his Company Political Officer and ordered to repeat an insignificant conversation he had had with a man who was squatting beside him in the latrine.

POW believed that approximately 50 percent of the men in his company were secretly pro-CNA. Approximately 30 percent were illiterates who were serving in the CCF because they had been forced to and were completely lethargic and had no interest in anything except eating, sleeping, and performing their assigned duties, while waiting an opportunity to desert. (No. 1060)¹⁰

The foregoing statement, like others in this report, is the testimony of a single individual of unknown reliability. However, it is reproduced here as one a number of similar statements because it illuminates one important CCF weakness: the soldiers' resentment at forced conscription under the guise of "volunteering."

The following two statements reflect resentment toward and weaknesses in the criticism technique.

However, when we got to [] they said I was an old soldier with a reliable background and promoted me to squad leader. That's where my troubles began! I tried to refuse but I was brought up in front of the company for "self-criticism" for ducking responsibility. I had more "self-criticism" thrown at me after that for mistakes and stupidity, all because I'm illiterate.

Self-criticism isn't so bad though. I had a lot (chuckle). All you have to do is to listen carefully, pretend to understand what is being said, and then be remorseful and promise to do better. (No. 702187)⁹

Fellow soldier, deserted, apprehended. He was brought up before the company for a confession and "self-criticism," and then he made a frank statement of the motives for his desertion. However, the political officer was absent, attending a regimental meeting, and in consequence not one of the men including the party members offered a word of criticism, since there was sympathy with the deserter. As a result, the man got off scot-free without any punishment. (No. 708850)⁹

The following is a very revealing picture of weaknesses as viewed officially at CCF Army level.

I. From the time the units entered Korea they have, for reasons unrelated to combat, suffered serious losses in personnel. Especially there have been a terrifying number of suicides and self-inflicted wounds. In view of the above... a Party meeting was convened....

A. List of Personnel Losses.

Statistics on Personnel Losses

Cause	Units					Total
	Army Hq 6th	Arty Regt	202d Div	203d Div	304th Div	
Desertions		8	63	93	103	261
Self-inflicted wounds	1			4	3	8
Suicides	2	1	2	8	4	17

[REDACTED]

Statistics on Personnel Losses (Cont'd)

Cause	Units					Total
	Army Hq 6th	Arty Regt	202d Div	203d Div	304th Div	
Injured in accidents	2		14	24	10	50
Killed in accidents	9	1	12	19	12	53
Evacuated patients	72		67	198	59	396
Stragglers	41	9	8	56	13	127
Missing in action		1	2	7	10	20
Died from disease			1			1
Executions		1	1			2
Total	<u>127</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>170</u>	<u>409</u>	<u>214</u>	<u>941</u>

Remarks: Period covered 20 June to 5 August 1951
(304th Div dates back to 9 June 51)

B. Principal Causes of Losses Among Unit Personnel.

1. Gradual Resurgence of "War-lordism" Throughout the Units.

In small group leaders and in some officers of battalion and regimental level, there has been a tendency toward such unreasonable and barbarous practices towards our soldiers as trussing, hanging up, rough handling, beating, scolding threats, etc. All these are completely in opposition to the principles upon which our Party's armed forces were founded.

A few of the officers have developed a one-sided military viewpoint, stubbornly and rigidly clinging to command in the execution of duties and neglecting the political and cultural life of the troops. One commander of a heavy artillery battery was bored and annoyed with participating in Party Branch meetings and thought them to be useless.

The men question the ability of the officers to command, and the officers doubt whether the men are brave enough to fight. This mutual distrust has caused some soldiers (especially recruits) to deviate from their loyalty and become discontent. A new recruit [] of the Replacement Training Regiment said: "To resist America and aid KOREA leads to certain death." There were many who also felt that death was inevitable. Of the new recruits in the 2d Company, 607th Regiment, seven out of ten had this view, hence the increase in suicides, self-inflicted wounds, and desertions.

2. Weak Thought Leadership in the Party and Ineffective Political Work.

One political officer of a certain company in the 611th Regiment said to a soldier who attempted suicide: "Why didn't you accomplish your suicide? If you really want to die I will make you a present of a hand grenade" (upon which he brought forth a grenade, which the soldier did not accept). The soldier deserted two days later. Obviously, with such attacks taking the place of proper persuasion and leadership, unity cannot be attained; instead everyone will lose loyalty to the unit. Personnel losses reflect the lack of foresight, inability to cope with problems, and weaknesses of our Party Commissars, political agencies, and personnel of various levels.

3. Impractical, Unconvincing, and Undemocratic Leadership; Loose Administration and Party Discipline.

[REDACTED]

Due to their reluctance to mingle with the lower ranks and to participate in investigations, many of our high-ranking authorities fail to understand their subordinates and their problems.

We reach the conclusions that the Party workers of all levels are chiefly responsible for the startling loss of personnel. Party Commissars of army, division, and regimental level have been guilty of failing to understand the troops, of ineffectual leadership and control, bureaucratic tendencies, and lack of foresight.

II. Key personnel of various levels must do all in their power to overcome the problem of personnel losses by improving their methods of command, and *reinforcing the political indoctrination of the cadre, in order to awaken their class consciousness and promote unity among the troops.* [Author's italics] To achieve this goal the Army Party Committee has made the following resolutions.

A. In order to achieve unity between the officers and men, the leaders of various levels must cultivate and improve their political knowledge, work efficiency, class consciousness, and their concern for and the leadership of the revolutionary armed forces. As Commander in Chief CHU has said: "All members of the cadre should learn the use of the principles of MARX and LENIN and the use of revolutionary methods in commanding the troops of the revolution." He has frequently cautioned our commanders that only by proper commands, deep concern for the men, working toward their welfare and setting examples and through justice, will the love and confidence of the subordinates be won. Ours is to lead by reason. The root of control and discipline is persuasion; force will be used only when resistance is encountered. Even then, the men must not be abused physically nor berated.

B. Abide by the doctrine that encouragement is the greater part of leadership. Develop positive measures and systematically develop the constructive desires of the masses.

C. Advocate a democratic attitude on the part of the various commanding officers. Military, political, and economic democracy must be practiced in company administration in order to promote initiative and a progressive spirit in the masses. (No. 77, Item 4)¹³

DISCUSSION

The purpose here is to obtain a realistic appraisal of the potentialities of the enemy, neither overestimating nor underestimating his will-to-fight. It seems clear that he has developed and utilized certain techniques very effectively. It seems equally clear that in practice these techniques are not invincible. Paradoxically, the elements of the system which make for such strength as it possesses contain also the seeds of weakness and vulnerability.

It has been pointed out that surveillance is everywhere in the CCF and NKA; it is the prevailing social climate. Surveillance provides the raw material for the criticism meeting, it serves as a basis upon which rewards are awarded, and it constantly keeps the men at a high level of political consciousness. A significant aspect of this system of surveillance and control is that the individual does not have even the opportunity to remain neutral or to withdraw to his private world. The effort to mold personality along acceptable lines is relentless; one must participate. Thus the development of group ties is channelized. Any soldier with

[REDACTED]

the normal need for social interaction has no choice but to find it in a prescribed ideological framework or to escape physically the social setting entirely. Surveillance is a powerful weapon for maintaining conformity, and for those who accept the indoctrination message and identify with the Party, it probably is not only satisfying but rewarding. The fundamental weakness, however, is that no room is allowed for the growth and expression of individualism. The objection might be raised that this is a value of Western democracies and does not necessarily apply to the armies in question. The evidence from this study, the number of desertions and suicides, and general psychological and anthropological theory tend to uphold the view that the need to express one's individuality is not uncommon in the Chinese and the North Korean.

An element of the CCF and NKA systems which has enormous tactical and strategic significance lies in the ambitious effort to modify personality, broadly defined.

... to regard this process as a means of external control over the individual would be a great mistake. The objective is far deeper.... It is to infuse the individual with a moral fervor, to produce an actual conversion which will make him want to subordinate his personal desires to the codes and thus to the purposes of the State or Party.¹⁴

It has been apparent to many that Communism has religious aspects. The CCF methods of motivation appeal strongly and cleverly to the Chinese interest in morality for its own sake. Religion, as such, is officially frowned upon.* In a sense, perhaps Communism offers a substitute for the needs of human beings which are satisfied by religious faith. Religion makes high demands; the Party also makes high demands. It provides a noble, morally correct, and difficult goal—that of submission of the individual to the Party. The technique of the criticism meeting creates both a feeling of guilt and shame and the means whereby the guilt can be expiated—redemption through atonement. The theme is aggressively pursued that the Communist goal is the moral goal and any deviation from this in thought or action is anti-Communist and ipso facto cause for guilt. Failure to fight, fear of death, etc. are sinful. The individual, if still not motivated, knows that he is being watched and that, if he survives, will be subjected to the psychologically painful experience of public criticism. A psychiatrist would probably support the thesis that the individual burdened with feelings of guilt will seek means of relief. The CCF offers such a means through specific activities in con-

* In one study,³ 54 out of 60 privates and 17 of 23 officers professed no religion.

██████████

formity to its goals, and for a member of the CCF this is virtually the individual's only means short of physical or psychopathic escape. In effect, then, the Communists possess and vigorously utilize a potentially potent psychological bag of tricks with the CCF or NKA serving as an object of emotional cathexis. This effective technique is furthered by the absence of more "normal" means of obtaining emotional satisfactions.


A long range vulnerability of this aspect of the CCF and NKA lies in the tremendous responsibility placed upon these armies to maintain the identification of morality with the Party mission. In the military sphere, victory must be achieved or the righteousness of the cause must be questioned. We have seen that a basic theme of indoctrination has been in terms of moral armament against a particular target. Counterevidence, effectively presented, of the human values of this target should weaken the impact of indoctrination.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT


The CCF and NKA methods of motivating riflemen appear to have two goals or purposes. The short range or tactical goal is to ensure effective immediate combat performance through control and, to the extent possible, through establishing conviction. This is illustrated in this statement of a political officer:

How does the CCF get its men to charge up a hill madly? This is the key to the CCF system of control. Decisions to attack... are made in an ostensibly democratic manner. The squad has a meeting. In a typical squad of eight or nine men there will tend to be two Party faithfuls, four in the middle's and two "falling behinds." The squad leader will suggest attack, the company political officer may attend and cast his vote; perhaps two of the four in-betweens will go along with the majority. The remainder have no choice. (No. 73)⁶

The long range or strategic goal is to bring about complete acceptance of and identification with the Party by all soldiers, i.e., expanding the hard core. The tactical goal of securing effective combat performance through control has been quite successful, although even here many evidences of weakness have been noted. The strategic goal appears to have been only moderately successful during the period of the Korean War. However, the following factors should be considered: (a) without the pressures of combat, more time will be available to strengthen and complete the indoctrination program; (b) future soldiers will have had a solid grounding in political training prior to military service; and (c) ex-CNA personnel, the greatest source of dissension



at the present time, will decrease in numbers and influence. The US Army cannot afford to underestimate the determination, shrewdness, and thoroughness of this enemy.



CHAPTER VII

ROKA METHODS OF INDOCTRINATION*

One of the purposes of this study was to make a gross comparison between enemy and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) methods of motivating combat troops. This has been accomplished to a limited extent. The data were obtained through 21 personnel interviewed at ROKA Replacement Training Center No. 1 at Mosulp'o, Cheju-do, Korea. These were eight ROKA officers (including a major in charge of indoctrination at the Center and two general officers), five KMAG advisors, six US enlisted instructors, and two ROKA enlisted men.

The most obvious fact that emerges from viewing ROKA methods of training and indoctrination is that they are essentially US methods as transmitted through KMAG. It follows from this that relatively little time or effort is expended on the process of indoctrination as such. What is offered is the US Information and Education type of program consisting primarily of a lecture, supplemented informally by the company commander in the evening, by information as time permits, as upon arrival at the RTC, and by the distribution of leaflets and other literature. The program is considered to have the function of maintaining morale through the dissemination of pictures and reading material, teaching reading and writing, and keeping the men occupied.

One lecture (which was attended by an ORO consultant) was essentially an historical summary of the events leading to the Korean War, designs of the Communist enemy, bad faith of the Communists, Communist atrocities, influence of USSR, UN effort, and the effect on Korea and loved ones if the war is lost. It was a polished performance with intense emotionality evident. Its appeal was largely negative.

Some of the Koreans themselves, particularly those engaged in I&E, are aware of some of the shortcomings of the program,

*Data obtained on the ROKA emphasized information on military skill training needed for another report. The paucity of material in this chapter reflects not only this factor but also the lack of emphasis on indoctrination in the ROKA.

[REDACTED]

and expressed their attitudes in interviews. They believe that the ROKA needs much more indoctrination than is customary in the US since their soldiers are less educated. Some of the soldiers never heard of the UN, democracy, and Communism, and do not know why they are fighting. Their advice, however, is not to increase the ideological component of the indoctrination but rather to present the motivating message in simple terms such as revenge on the North Koreans for burning down their villages, i.e., concrete, specific, more or less physical and emotional reasons for fighting. The South Koreans say, then, that more time and more personnel are needed in the I&E program, although there was a wide range of opinion among them on this.

The contrast between the effort devoted to political training in the CCF-NKA and the ROKA is marked. At RTC No. 1, the lecture is scheduled for one hour in a basic training course which lasts 14 or 16 weeks. Recall the pervasive indoctrination in the CCF and NKA! The ROKA major interviewed here declared that, in the NKA, 60 percent of the Army budget is allotted to the equivalent of I&E activities.

In combat, a South Korean Army corps has two officers assigned to I&E functions; a North Korean Army corps has 18—nine times as many. In the NKA, the I&E personnel (i.e., political officers) are key men with considerable authority and power; in the ROKA the job is not considered to have much status (perhaps as much or less than the CCF cultural officers). In the combat zone, some attempts are made by the South Korean I&E personnel to infuse company commanders with the need to continue indoctrination.

This limited picture of ROKA indoctrination is sufficient to provide the basis for some broad comparisons and conclusions. The comparisons can be made on at least two levels. The higher level would be a comparison of Communist methods and US methods. Perhaps more fruitful for Army purposes is a comparison on a more specific basis, such as Communist methods as applied to Chinese and North Koreans versus US methods as applied to South Koreans.

There is no direct evidence of the effectiveness of the US-sponsored indoctrination program as applied to the ROKA. It is known that there is a marked difference between the indoctrination experienced by Korean soldiers who are, roughly, north of the 38th parallel and Korean soldiers south of the 38th parallel. The indoctrination of the North Korean is more of a personal experience; it is related to his culture; it demands a significant amount of his time and energy. The indoctrination of the South Korean is the

[REDACTED]

indoctrination of the American soldier from Arkansas, with whatever modifications the South Koreans can bring to bear, such as emotionality of expression.

When Chinese train Chinese and Koreans train Koreans, their methods are vastly different from those used by Americans. This fact alone does not prove the methods to be superior or more effective. It does, however, suggest that the US Army has a great deal to learn in successfully fulfilling its relatively new role of advising Oriental troops. It suggests further that the South Koreans themselves be given more opportunity to develop and conduct their own methods for motivating their own troops.

[REDACTED]

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Methods Used by CCF and NKA in Motivating Rifleman for Combat

1. CCF and NKA methods are basically oriented toward securing the individual's acceptance of the political goals of the Communist Party.
2. Communist methods include efforts at three levels: (a) improving the physical, social, and psychological well-being of the soldier; (b) providing, through indoctrination, a reason for fighting. The US is depicted as a militant aggressor against Korea and China; (c) utilizing specific techniques to promote effective combat performance. Those studied in this report are "speak-bitterness" sessions, challenge or competition system, pledge-signing, criticism meetings, and post-combat critiques.
3. CCF and NKA methods exploit social and psychological, rather than physical, rewards and punishments.
4. The NKA POWs appear to have been exposed less frequently than CCF soldiers to the specific motivational techniques described in this study.
5. At least half of the rifleman's time in service is devoted to political training in some form.
6. The US soldier is depicted as the weakest factor in the US Army; ROKA soldiers are depicted as better fighters.

Effectiveness of the Methods

1. CCF and NKA methods appear to be quite effective in maintaining individual control, but only moderately successful in modifying basic attitudes.

[REDACTED]

2. A large percentage of present-day soldiers have not been exposed to indoctrination prior to their military experience. It may be expected that future riflemen will be more favorably predisposed toward accepting the Army indoctrination message.

3. CCF and NKA methods are considered to be more effective by the officers responsible for carrying them out than by the enlisted men at whom they were directed.

4. Strengths: (a) the methods capitalize on and exploit such Oriental values as saving face and supporting a moral cause; (b) these armies are succeeding in improving the lot of the common soldier; (c) the armies emphasize reward for effective performance rather than punishment for ineffective performance.

5. Weaknesses: (a) success of the system depends on the "hard core" within the Army; (b) the methods are vulnerable to the extent that promises and goals are not achieved; (c) many soldiers are aware, and resent the fundamentally coercive aspects of the system; (d) the system provides no opportunity for individual expression; (e) the humiliation of public criticism may force negative feelings to go "underground," constituting a powerful source of rebellion should the opportunity arise; (f) the methods are vulnerable to the extent that these armies are unable to maintain the identification of morality with the Party mission.

Comparison of the ROKA Methods with Those of the CCF and NKA

1. ROKA methods of motivating combat riflemen are essentially US methods with little apparent attempt to capitalize on Korean values, culture, or traditions.

2. CCF-NKA methods strike more deeply and personally; they involve the individual not only on a verbal but on an emotional level.

3. CCF-NKA methods are more pervasive, time-consuming, and continuous, involving every aspect of the individual's military life.

4. CCF-NKA methods are more purposive, providing specific, tangible, concrete, and potentially rewarding goals.

Implications for the US Army

1. It may be expected that the methods Communists apply to their troops are applied also to US POWs.

2. The enemy's correct recognition of US strong points gives some credence to the enemy version of the primary US weak point, i.e., the soldier's lack of will-to-fight.

[REDACTED]

3. Compared with CCF-NKA, the US Army has virtually no program for motivating riflemen for combat in terms of time spent, organization, and purposiveness. Although wide cultural differences exist between the groups, this report suggests the advisability of further study on US Army methods of motivation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Disseminate information concerning CCF and NKA methods, strengths, and weaknesses to: (a) staff personnel engaged in strategic planning for military and political warfare in the Orient; (b) Army field commanders in the Far East, for use in tactical planning and operations; (c) TI&E personnel, for providing troops with a more realistic appraisal of the nature of the enemy; (d) CI&E and POW command personnel, for better understanding the motivations and background of Oriental POWs; (e) Military Advisory Groups attached to Oriental armies, to assist them in better understanding the values and culture of these groups.

2. Counteract CCF and NKA will-to-fight through: (a) military pressure and defeat. This holds particular significance in these armies, since implicit in the Chinese culture is the belief that an unsuccessful venture must have a moral flaw. (b) Concentrating on the following psychological warfare themes: (1) fallibility of CCF-NKA leadership, (2) essential immorality of CCF-NKA war aims, (3) essential morality and humaneness of the US, (4) pseudo-democratic Communist methods, (5) unfulfilled promises of Army, (6) cruelty of self-criticism.

3. Critically appraise the indoctrination program of the US Army. The findings of this study suggest that: (a) the proportion of time spent on indoctrination functions could be increased; (b) the peculiar characteristics of American culture and value can be more effectively and meaningfully related to will-to-fight; (c) social pressures and positive rewards can be more effectively exploited in US Army indoctrination.

4. Give our Oriental allies more autonomy in developing their own indoctrination. Allow them to capitalize on themes and methods effective for them, rather than using themes and methods which are assumed to be effective with Western nations.

5. Reindoctrinate Oriental POWs with a positive program focussed on the psywar themes recommended. Provide a substantive and purposive alternative cause with which they can ally themselves upon release.



Appendix A

INTERROGATION OPERATIONS



INTERROGATION OPERATIONS*

All interrogations for this study were conducted by military and civilian personnel on duty with US Army Military Intelligence Service Companies. These personnel were experienced interrogators and interpreters. Preliminary interview questionnaires had been drawn up in the ZI based on discussions and preliminary review of the literature.^{14,16} These questionnaires were revised in Korea on the basis of a limited pretest of the forms and discussions with the interrogators assigned to the study.

Interrogations were conducted at POW Transit Camp No. 1 near Seoul, and POW Camp No. 2 near Pusan, Korea. The number of POWs and the interrogators' ratings of the reliability of the reports actually used in the study are indicated here.

Group	Camp		Rating	
	No. 1	No. 2	Fair	Good
CCF	22	23	24	21
NKA	6	12	11	7
Total	28	35	35	28

All interrogations were conducted from October through December 1952. In addition to the 63 reports used in this study, four were rejected or not carried to completion on the basis of the interrogators' judgments that the subjects were too unreliable, i.e., uncooperative or inconsistent. Four additional interrogations were not completed because the prisoners were placed on shipping orders. Although the Army personnel assigned to this project were experienced in interrogating prisoners for intelligence purposes, some time was spent in briefing and training them in the

*The author's ORO-S-57(FEC) "Notes on Prisoner of War Interrogation in Korea," contains further discussion on the practical problems of selection of targets, methods of interrogation, recruiting and utilizing language personnel, reliability of POW testimony, etc.

[REDACTED]

nature and purpose of this research study and the use of the Interrogator's Guides.

All of the CCF POWs were interrogated directly in Chinese, the interrogator writing the replies in English. Some of the NKA POWs were interrogated directly in Korean by Korean-English speaking interrogators. Most of the North Koreans, however, were interrogated through an interpreter who translated the Korean into Japanese for the interrogator, who, in turn, wrote the answer in English.

The data collected for this study were obtained at the same time and from the same subjects as the data for a separate study on the skill training of enemy combat riflemen, which will be reported separately. A single questionnaire was used, however, and from the point of view of the interrogators and the prisoners this was all one study. Administration time for the total schedule averaged two and one-half days per POW at Camp No. 2 and one day at Camp No. 1. This difference may be due to the fact that G-2 interrogations at Camp No. 1 were tactical, with emphasis on speed, whereas at Camp No. 2, interrogators had the habit and mission of conducting strategic interrogations for longer periods of time.

Appendix B

ENLISTED POW SAMPLE

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[REDACTED]

ENLISTED POW SAMPLE

DESCRIPTION

Because of practical limitations on the number of new prisoners available, a relatively small number of soldiers who were not serving most recently as combat riflemen were included in the study. Some of these had served as riflemen earlier in their military career; most had been trained as riflemen; all had been subjected to the motivational practices of their respective armies.

Emphasis was placed on interrogating POWs as close in time to their capture or surrender as possible. By restricting the sample to the first two camps through which prisoners passed, this objective was met with reasonable satisfaction.

TABLE B1
BREAKDOWN OF SURRENDER-CAPTURE STATUS^a

Army	Surrendered	Captured
CCF	26	19
NKA	16	2

^aArmy classification of the POW with respect to surrender or capture was accepted. Further refinement of this dichotomy was not considered necessary for this study.



TABLE B2
RANK AND MILITARY DUTY OF POW SAMPLE

Rank	CCF	NKA
Rank		
Pvt	43	14
Cpl (asst sqd ldr)	1	3
Sgt (sqd ldr)	1	-
Sr sgt	-	1
Duty		
Rifleman	33	8
Ammo bearer	4	4
Asst sqd ldr	1	-
Sqd ldr	1	-
Recon	-	1
Asst gunner	1	-
Ammo loader	-	1
Cook	2	-
Submachine gunner	-	3
Bazooka man	1	-
HMG bearer	1	-
Guard	1	-
Farmer ^a	-	1

^aMany North Korean farmers, railroad workers, and other non-combatants are officially in the armed forces.



TABLE B3
TIME IN DETENTION

Months	CCF	NKA
Less than 1/2	6	3
1/2 to 1	18	2
2	9	8
3	6	4
4	4	1
5	2	-

TABLE B4
AGE

Years	CCF	NKA
Under 21	9	4
21-25	20	9
26-30	10	4
31-35	5	1
Over 35	1	-

TABLE B5
EDUCATION

Years	CCF	NKA
0	16	3
1	6	2
2	10	2
3	4	-
4	3	-
5	5	2
6	-	6
7	-	-
8	-	-
9 or more	-	5
No answer	1	-

TABLE B6
CIVILIAN OCCUPATION

Type	CCF	NKA
Farmer	29	9
Merchant	-	2
Laborer	2	1
Student	2	2
Skilled tradesman	5	1
Fisherman	2	-
Peddler	2	1
Salesman	3	-
Teacher	-	1
No answer	-	1



TABLE B7
PREVIOUS MILITARY EXPERIENCE

Years	CCF	NKA
None	18	14
Less than 1	10 (CNA)	2 (ROKA) 2 (JAP)
1-5	12 (CNA)	
6-10	5 (CNA)	

TABLE B8
LENGTH OF SERVICE

Years	CCF	NKA
Less than 1	3	3
1-2	28	13
2-3	10	2
3-4	2	-
4-5	1	-
5-6	0	-
6-7	1	-

TABLE B9
TIME IN COMBAT

Weeks	CCF	NKA
0	2	4
1-4	12	4
8-26	13	4
26-52	7	1
Over 52	7	2
No answer	4	3





Appendix C

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLE

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REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLE

At the time of the study the number of prisoners being taken was very small. Virtually all ex-combat riflemen available at the two POW camps visited during the data-gathering phase of this study were interrogated. The representativeness of the sample compared to the then-existing population at these camps is extremely high. It is pertinent, however, to ask if this population is typical of other POW populations who had been processed earlier. Some evidence is available in answering this question concerning the CCF POWs. FEC Intelligence, Psychological Warfare Section, published a research analysis of 133 CCF POWs taken into custody during the period April to July 1952.¹⁵ The ORO data have been analyzed to conform to the Psywar descriptive categories insofar as possible. The comparison between the two independent populations may be seen in Table C1.

The two groups are strikingly similar. The largest difference occurs in the item "Time in Combat"; this difference probably lies in the definition of "in combat." In both studies the typical POW is a rifleman with rank of private, age 25, illiterate, and a farmer in civilian life. He has served about two years in the CCF after having served in the CNA, spent a short time in combat with the CCF, and then surrendered to UN Forces.

A more difficult question is "how representative is this sample of the total enemy armies?" Categorically, it is not a typical sample; the mere fact that these men are in UN hands differentiates them from their comrades who are still fighting. The degree to which this sample is unrepresentative cannot be determined; in terms of the present study, however, it seems reasonable to assume that it represents a minimum picture of effectiveness of Communist indoctrination. Conclusions which are drawn regarding effectiveness are based not only on this sample but on a large amount of additional information and opinion.

With respect to the description of specific techniques and methods, all available evidence indicates that the exposure of this group was similar to the general exposure in the respective armies.

The sample interrogated was drawn widely from the CCF and NKA. The number of different military units represented is shown in Table C2.

TABLE C1
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS ON CCF POWS
(ORO study, N = 45; FEC psywar study, N = 133)

Categories	FEC Psywar	ORO
Rank, average	Pvt	Pvt
Age, mean	25.3	24
Duty	Rifleman	Rifleman
Education		
No school, %	39.0	36.6
Months, average	28.4	24 (median)
Custody status, %		
Surrender	58.0	57.7
Capture	42.0	42.3
Length of service, months	27.1	24.0
Time in combat, months		
Under 1	51.0	34.0
1-3	31.0	12.0
4-6	3.0	19.0
Over 6	15.0	34.0
Ex-CNA, %	66.0	62.0
Civilian occupation, %		
Farmer	57.7	64.4
Merchant	11.4	11.1
Laborer	7.3	4.4
Student	5.7	4.4
Tradesman	4.1	8.8
Soldier	4.1	0.0
Clerk	3.3	0.0
Civil service	3.3	0.0
Other	3.1	6.7

TABLE C2
MILITARY UNITS REPRESENTED IN SAMPLE

Organization	CCF	NKA
Armies	9	
Corps		5
Divisions (or Brigades)	16	10
Regiments	24	11
Battalions	33	13
Companies	37	13
Platoons	39	14
Squads	40	14

Four CCF POWs had served in the same squad, two in another, and two more in another. In the NKA sample, the maximum number of men serving in the same squad was two.

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Appendix D

INTERROGATOR'S GUIDE—FORM FOR
COMBAT RIFLEMAN

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**INTERROGATOR'S GUIDE—
FORM FOR COMBAT RIFLEMAN***

I. Face Sheet Data

A. Identification Information

POW Number: Circle One: CCF NK

POW Name:

Rank:

Age: Date of Birth:

Military Duty at Time of Capture:

Unit at Time of Capture:

Education (civilian) — Last Grade Completed:

Main Civilian Occupation:

Place of Birth (Province or Do):

Name of Interrogator:

Interrogator's Evaluation of Report (Consider competence of POW as an observer, his education, military training and combat experience, biases, personality and cooperativeness, political convictions, attitude toward interrogation, attitude toward war, etc.):

Reliability of Report:

B. Chronology

1. Pre-Korean War military experience (training and combat), if any:

a. With armies other than CCF or NKA:

b. Before Korean War in CCF or NKA:

2. CCF or NKA military experience (include details of military training and combat experience—begin with induction):

3. Date of Capture or Surrender:

IV. Indoctrination (Political Training)

A. General Description

1. How much political training did you receive during
(a) basic training, (b) unit training, (c) in combat?

*These are the items, pertinent to this study, taken from the master form used to secure additional information for another report by the author.

- [REDACTED]
2. Who were your instructors at each of the above three phases of training?
 3. Describe the methods used by your army in indoctrination of each phase of training. Probe for and obtain descriptions of:
 - a. "Speak-bitterness" sessions:
 - b. Self-criticism:
 - c. Pledge-signing:
 - d. "Challenge" system:
 - e. Threatened punishment:
 - f. Promise of rewards:
 - g. Constant surveillance by other members of the organization (both positive and negative):
 - h. Use of drugs or narcotics:
 - i. Post-battle critiques: How conducted?
 - j. Other techniques (specify each):
 4. How much and what kind of political indoctrination had you received prior to entering the CCF or NK Army?
 5. What most made you want to fight the UN Forces?
 6. What were you told were the strengths and weaknesses of US Forces? Of ROK Forces?

B. Indoctrination content and effect

There follows a list of statements which your leaders may or may not have told you. For each statement tell me (1) were you told this, (2) if yes, during which phase of training, (3) did you believe it at the time it was told to you; do you now believe it to be true?

1. If you are captured by the Americans they will kill you.
2. You are not to retire from the combat line until ordered, even if you are wounded.
3. The Americans are spreading germs among our troops.
4. If you lag behind in combat you will be shot by one of your officers.
5. It is more honorable to die in battle than to be captured by the enemy.
6. You are constantly being watched and reported on by other soldiers in your unit.
7. (Ask CCF only — do not ask NKs). If the Americans win in Korea, they will invade your homeland and destroy your family.

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C. Evaluation

1. How effective was the indoctrination program of your army in making you want to fight?
 - a. Very effective
 - b. Quite effective
 - c. Fairly effective
 - d. Not too effective
 - e. Very ineffective
2. In what ways could the indoctrination training be improved?
3. In what ways is the indoctrination program strong and effective?
4. Were there any other devices or procedures, beyond those that have been mentioned, that made you, or the other soldiers around you, fight harder? How effective were each of these devices?
5. The interrogator will record here any significant information he has obtained from this POW relative to CCF or NK methods of training and indoctrination not covered elsewhere in this guide.

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Appendix E

INTERROGATOR'S GUIDE—FORM FOR POLITICAL
AND CULTURAL OFFICERS

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INTERROGATOR'S GUIDE--
FORM FOR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL OFFICERS*

I. Face Sheet Data

A. Identification Information

POW Number: Circle one: CCF NK

POW Name:

Rank:

Age: Date of Birth:

Military Duty at Time of Capture:

Unit at Time of Capture:

Education (civilian) - Last Grade Completed:

Main Civilian Occupation:

Place of Birth (Province or Do):

Name of Interrogator:

Interrogator's Evaluation of Report (Consider competence of POW as an observer, his education, military training and combat experience, biases, personality and cooperativeness, political convictions, attitude toward interrogation, attitude toward war, etc.):

Reliability of Report:

B. Chronology

1. Pre-Korean War military experience (training and combat), if any:
 - a. With armies other than CCF or NKA: Broad outline only
 - b. Before Korean War in CCF or NKA:
2. CCF or NKA military experience (include details of military training and combat experience--begin with induction):
3. Date of Capture or Surrender:

II. "Icebreakers" -- suggestions

- A. 1. How did you and other political or cultural officers get into this kind of work?

*These are the items, pertinent to this study, taken from the master form used to secure additional information for another report by the author.

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- ██████████
2. How were you selected? How were others selected?
Was it difficult to get this kind of assignment?
 3. How were you trained for political work, cultural work? How were others trained? How much did men like to get this kind of training?
 4. What rewards were there in it for you and other instructors to do (political, cultural) work?
- B. What did you do, or what were your specific duties as a (political or cultural officer) at each location?

IV. Indoctrination (Political Training)

A. Chronological Phases

1. Indoctrination during basic training
 - a. Who is responsible for political indoctrination?
 - b. Amount of time spent?
 - c. Number of students in class (If different from training):
 - d. Manuals used:
 - e. Equipment and training aids used:
 - f. Who were instructors: (How were they selected? Trained? How good were they?)
 - g. Changes in indoctrination over a period of time:
 - h. Was progress measured in any way? What happened as a result of progress checks?
 - i. Teaching methods:
 - j. Did all recruits receive same indoctrination? If not, why not? What were some other kinds of indoctrination procedures?
 - k. Were political inspectors utilized? If so, how respected were they?
 - l. How much importance do you think your army attaches to the indoctrination function as compared with skill training?
2. Indoctrination during specialty training
Repeat subjects listed in IV, a-1, basic training.
3. Indoctrination during Unit training
Repeat subjects listed in IV, a-1, basic training, and in addition ask:
 - m. Is the proportion of emphasis on group vs individual indoctrination different in the unit training phase from the basic training phase?

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4. In-combat indoctrination

Repeat subjects listed in IV, A, 1, basic training, and ask in addition:

- n. Are critiques held following a battle? How are they conducted? Is this standard practice or does it depend on the commander, the circumstances, etc.?
- o. What did soldiers do in the front line when they were not fighting?
- p. What did soldiers do in reserve when they were not fighting?

B. Over-all Summary and Evaluation

1. Summary

- a. Describe the methods used by your army to indoctrinate soldiers:

Probe for:

- (1) "Speak-bitterness" sessions
 - (2) Self-criticism
 - (3) Pledge-signing
 - (4) "Challenge" system
 - (5) Threats
 - (6) Promise of rewards
 - (7) Constant surveillance by other members of the organization (both positive and negative)
 - (8) Use of drugs or narcotics
 - (9) Post-battle critiques. How conducted?
 - (10) Other techniques
 - (11) Are the techniques used standard practice throughout the Army or does their use depend on the particular commander, the circumstances, etc.? If they depend on the commander, what commander characteristics lead to the use of what techniques?
- b. Is it true that the soldiers of your army are trained to obey their superiors blindly? How is this accomplished?
 - c. Is the kind of indoctrination program that a soldier receives dependent upon his pre-induction political leanings, youth group membership, political club or party membership?
 - d. What were your soldiers told were the strengths and weaknesses of US forces? Of ROK forces?

2. Evaluation

- a. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the indoctrination program and policies of your army as far as making the soldier want to fight is concerned?
 - (1) Very effective
 - (2) Quite effective
 - (3) Fairly effective
 - (4) Not too effective
 - (5) Very ineffective
- b. In what ways could the program be improved?
- c. In what ways do you think the program is strong and effective?

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